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ABSTRACT 
Apart from the fact there is continuous support and nurturing ofBumiputera 
entrepreneurship by the Malaysian government, very little is known about the politically-
affiliated business group in Malaysia. This 100 percent Bumiputera group of companies 
emerged as a result of the New Economic Policy. It started as a group of ailing 
businesses in the early 1980s, but with strong support from the government and 
ingenious Bumiputera leadership, it became one of the biggest, if not the biggest, 
conglomerates in the country. This dissertation examines the profitability performance, 
investment and financing decisions of the politically-affiliated business group, and 
compares it to that of independent group. Since studies on corporate grouping are 
mostly concentrated in the "bank oriented" system of the Japanese keiretsu [Nakatani 
(1984); Kester (1991, 1992); Kaplan (1992); Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein (1990, 
1991); Prowse (1990, 1992)], the existence of the results from research on the Japanese 
system allows us to provide an explanation of the behavior of the corporate grouping in 
Malaysia, within the context of the politically-affiliated business group. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The theory of corporate grouping mainly revolves around the corporate 
grouping in Japan and in the United States. Some of the earliest literature on corporate 
grouping was by Berle and Means1 (1932). Ever since researchers and academics 
developed an interest in the Japanese keiretsu, the theory of corporate grouping 
developed in the days of Berle and Means has become synonymous with the theory of 
Japanese corporate grouping. Japanese keiretsu firms have received considerable 
attention since the emergence of Japan as an economic super power of the world. 
The keiretsu emerged as a result of government's intervention in the Japanese 
economic systems. The accelerated growth of Japanese economy has been attached to 
the formation of the Japanese keiretsu system. Yet the keiretsu system is not without 
flaws. While some researchers have proposed that a system modeling the Japanese 
keiretsu system be adopted to reform the economies of eastern Europe, others have 
suggested against it. Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) claimed that keiretsu firms have lower 
1 
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means examined the separation of ownership and control in 
American industry. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, a book that for some six1y years has 
defined the intellectual mission of American corporate governance, reported that owners and major 
corporations had become atomistic shareholders lacking the ability, skill, information, and often the 
incentives to monitor the performance of specialized managers. 
profitability and growth rates than non keiretsu firms, and a system modeled after the 
Japanese keiretsu would further aggravate the reforming economies. 
This study examines another alternative to the corporate grouping. The 
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia is in many ways similar to the Japanese 
keiretsu. Based on previous study on the Japanese keiretsu, it is possible to draw direct 
comparisons and contrasts to the politically-affiliated firms of Malaysia. There are both 
similarities and differences between the Japan keiretsu and the politically-affiliated 
business group in Malaysia which illustrate why the Malaysian case is worth studying. 
First, like the Japanese keiretsu, there exist similar horizontal and vertical relationships 
within the politically-affiliated business group. However, while these relationships center 
around a financial core in the Japanese keiretsu, the relationship for the politically-
affiliated business group center around the ruling political party2, that is, the United 
Malays National Organization, better known as UMNO (pronounced as am-no). Second, 
even though the role of private bank is insignificant in the politically-affiliated business 
group, Yoshihara (1988) claimed that liquidity is not a constraint since firms in the 
politically-affiliated group get easy access to soft-loans provided by government-owned 
banks. Previous studies on the Japanese keiretsu have found that due to close main bank 
relationships, liquidity is less of a constraint for this group than for independent firms 
(Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991). Third, firms within the politically-affiliated 
business group also bail out one another in times of financial distress, which is similar to 
2 
The ruling political party is the Barisan Nasional, or the National Front. and is represented by the 
three main races in Malaysia. United Malays National Organization, or Utv1NO represents the Malays 
and Bwniputera; the Malaysian Chinese Association, or MCA, represents the ethnic Chinese, and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress, or MIC, represents the ethnic Indians. 
2 
the practice within the Japanese keiretsu. Hoshi et. al. provided evidence which suggests 
that group firms in Japan invested more than independent firms in the period following 
the onset of financial difficulty and subsequently enjoyed stronger future sales growth. 
Thus a group affiliation enhances the performance of Japanese companies with a recent 
history of financial trouble. Fourth, unlike the keiretsu group, the politically-affiliated 
business group has superior growth opportunities since it is 100 percent burniputera3-
controlled thus it is well-positioned to take advantage of government's privatization 
schemes. On the other hand, Nakatani (1984) observed that in Japan, the keiretsu group 
on average has significantly lower profit and growth rates than the independent firms, but 
the variability of both growth and profit rates of the group affiliated firms is much 
smaller than that of independent firms. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze whether the theory of capital 
structure behavior of corporate grouping developed thus far for the Japanese keiretsu 
groups can be applied to describe the profitability performance, investment behavior and 
capital structure of the politically-affiliated firms in Malaysia. As a comparison, I analyze 
and examine the determinants of these issues for independent firms in Malaysia. 
This study attempts to analyze three issues in the context of the politically-
affiliated business group in Malaysia. They are as follows: 
3 literally, son of lhe earth, which represents the indigenous race, and is often used interchangeably with 
Malays . 
3 
(I) The profitability performance; 
(2) The investment decision; and 
(3) The financing decision. 
Importance of the Study 
The keiretsu affiliation in Japan has been under scrutiny of researchers from all 
over the world. Despite the attention given to the keiretsu system, there remain 
conflicting views regarding the main bank system. Some researchers have proposed that 
a system modeling the Japanese keiretsu be adopted by the reforming economies in 
eastern Europe. Others have suggested against it, mainly because keiretsu firms have 
lower profitability and growth rate compared to non keiretsu firms. 
The nature of the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia is similar to 
the Japanese keiretsu. While the Japanese keiretsu may be unique, a similar study on 
another form of corporate groupings may allow us to determine whether similar 
characteristics exists among business groupings in the region. 
Unfortunately, while the keiretsu groups have received both positive and 
negative reactions from researchers and academics world-wide, the political-affiliated 
business group in Malaysia has somehow failed to receive any "unbiased" analysis. The 
New Economics Policy has been attacked as being biased towards businessmen with 
close links to United Malays National Organization. Critics alleged that wealth and 
opportunity seem to be concentrated in the hands of a few politically connected people. 
4 
However, many probably have not realized that over the years, this group has managed 
to create world class bumiputera companies. Even though the approach taken by this 
group does not translate into a broad redistribution of wealth to bumiputera, it means 
steering state assets to qualified bumiputera who are capable of turning them into profits. 
In return, this group of companies provides job opportunities for the bumiputera and 
attracts the best professionals, both bumiputera and non-bumiputera. The emphasis on 
quality over quantity4 for the sake of economic growth fits with Prime Minister Datuk 
Seri Dr. Mahathir's National Development Program, which succeeded the NEP in 1991 . 
Thus, the main purpose of this study is to provide an unbiased analysis of the 
performance of the politically-affiliated firms. If the results of this study indicate that the 
politically-affiliated business group firms have superior performance compared to 
independent firms, then there are reasons to believe that the Malaysian government has 
been successful in achieving economic parity for the Malays, who, just two decades ago, 
were the least successful racial group in terms of entrepreneurship in Malaysia. This 
study may also allow us to determine whether government intervention in the 
distribution of wealth is effective in creating superior economic performance for business 
entities. Additionally, it may determine whether politically-affiliated firms should be 
encouraged as the model system in other developing and reforming economies. 
4 
The earlier part of the NEP stressed on quantity, i.e. extending business opportunities to any 
bumiputera as long as he or she showed some interests in starting a business. This has resulted in 
bumiputeras owning 100% of continually losing companies. Thus the government viewed that it is much 
better to allocate business opportunities to bumiputera that can provide good results. which means 
selecting only the quality bumiputera to lead profitable companies. (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
12/21/95, p.30) 
5 
Dissertation Outline 
Chapter two reviews the literature on political involvement in business in 
Malaysia, theories and empirical works on corporate grouping developed for the 
Japanese keiretsu and similarities and differences between the Japanese keiretsu and 
Malaysian politically-affiliated business group. 
Chapter three discusses the model and hypotheses. First, it develops the models 
of profitability performance, financing behavior and investment behavior; Second, it 
discusses the major determinants of three models; Finally, it reviews the basic 
hypotheses ofthis study. 
Chapter four develops the research methodology. The chapter discusses the 
politically-affiliated group and independent group samples, the rational of the sample 
period of the study, the data sources, definition of variables, measurement of the 
variables and statistical models. 
Chapter five presents the data analyses and empirical results. First it discusses 
the summary statistics and conducts group comparison, next it discusses the regression 
results for the politically-affiliated group and also for the two independent groups, and 
finally it discusses the regression results for the entire sample. 
Chapter six presents the summary and conclusions of the dissertation. 
6 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The theory of corporate grouping mainly revolves around corporate grouping in 
both Japan and the United States. Some of the earliest literature on corporate grouping 
was by Berle and Means (1932). Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published "The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property 5 ", a book that for some sixty years has 
defined the intellectual mission of American corporate governance. It reported that 
owners and major corporations had become atomistic shareholders lacking the ability, 
skill, information, and often the incentives to monitor the performance of specialized 
managers. 
5 In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner means published a classical work on the economic power of big 
business. By examining the largest 200 nonfinancial American corporations, ranked by value of assets 
(total assets less depreciation reserves) at the close of the "Roaring Twenties" (as of January l , 1930), 
the authors confirmed that the top 200 big corporations, while only 0.07% of the total number of 
businesses, controlled about half of total corporate assets. They speculated that the management unit 
expands in scale as the corporate system is being adopted, thereby inevitably spreading share ownership. 
The dispersion of share ownership would make it possible to acquire the control of productive assets by 
holding a minimum of share ownership and eventually to establish " managerial control" with no 
influential share ownership at all. Accordingly, "ownership of wealth without appreciable control and 
control of wealth without appreciable ownership appear to be the logical outcome of corporate 
development". 
7 
Ever since researchers and academics developed an interest in the Japanese 
keiretsu, theory of corporate grouping developed in the days of Berle and Means has 
become synonymous with the theory of the Japanese corporate grouping. Interest in the 
Japanese keiretsu was generated by Japan' s impressive economic growth in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Recovering from the war-ravaged economy of the late 1940s, Japan became 
second in industrial exports to West Germany in 1978, surpassing the United States for 
the first time in history (Sato, 1980). The dynamic force behind this tremendous 
economic growth over more than three decades was Japan's modem industry run by 
large Japanese businesses which were and continue to be supported by the government. 
These groups of large enterprises, or known as the keiretsu, emerged as the result of 
government intervention in the Japanese economic system. However, while the corporate 
group in Japan is an indirect consequences of government's intervention into the 
economy, the corporate grouping in Malaysia can be considered as a direct consequence 
of politics intervention into business. The corporate grouping in Malaysia can be likened 
to the corporate grouping in Japan in several ways. However, unlike in Japan where the 
nexus of the corporate grouping centers on a main bank, the corporate grouping in 
Malaysia revolves around the ruling political party. Even though a bank and a political 
party are two distinct entities with very different functions and responsibilities, if the 
political party is involved in business, then under this scenario, the objective of the 
political party will be similar to the objective of a bank, that is to create wealth for the 
owners and shareholders. 
8 
The first section of this chapter describes the history behind the politically-
affiliated business group. It discusses the preferential treatment issue, the development of 
the New Economic Policy, and subsequently the political involvement in business in 
Malaysia. The second section reviews the literature on the corporate grouping in Japan 
and discusses the similarities and differences in the corporate structures of Japanese 
keiretsu firms and Malaysian politically-affiliated business group. The third and fourth 
sections review the literature on profitability performance, investment decisions and 
financing behavior. The last section summarizes the chapter. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether the politically-affiliated 
business group in Malaysia exhibits any behavior consistent with the behavior of 
corporate grouping. The three behavioral issues to be examined are profitability 
performance, investment decisions, and financing behavior. Additionally, this study will 
also compare the politically-affiliated business group with the independent group, with 
respect to the three issues. Thus the objective of this chapter is to discuss the 
development of the theory of corporate grouping developed for the Japanese keiretsu 
and relate this to the politically affiliated corporate grouping in Malaysia. 
The New Economic Policy (NEP) and political involvement in business in Malaysia 
Malaysia's population of 20 million6 people is made up of three main racial 
groups of Malays or bumiputera7, Chinese, and Indians. She gained her Independence on 
6 1996 figure. Source: Malaysia Economic Reports. 
7 
literally, son of the earth. It also represents the diverse indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak, but 
more commonly refers to the Malays. 
9 
August 31, 1957, from the British and formal political authority was handed to the 
Alliance Party. The Alliance, consisting of the United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress 
(MIC), represented the politically dominant Malay elements, Chinese business interests 
and the Indian middle class respectively. As part of the political compromise underlying 
the Alliance, the UMNO-led government was expected to continue to encourage the 
development of the Malay business community. According to Stenson (1980), the 
political compromise reached was meant to "guarantee Malay political and 
administrative dominance, with special assistance to promote Malay education and 
economic uplift, while guaranteeing citizenship rights and freedom from interference 
for non-Malay commerce, culture and individuals'>&_ 
This, in effect, was to protect the Malay community by providing it special 
rights, for its development. Thus, the Malays were granted special privileges in public 
services, land reservation, and in the award of scholarships, educational grants, licenses, 
and permits9 . At first, efforts by government departments and other agencies to assist the 
Malays were concentrated on opening up estate settlements and constructing roads, 
school, and other community facilities . The government used three main strategies in its 
attempt to develop a Malay industrial capitalist class (Jomo, 1988, p248) :-
a) Protection: Malay quotas were imposed on the award of business licenses, and in 
the area of government employment, and education. 
8 Stenson, 1980, p4 7. 
9 Jomo, 1988, p253. 
10 
b) Assistance: Facilities were provided in the form of credit, training, and business 
premises. 
c) Acquisition: Malay ownership of the corporate economy was to be expanded. 
Jomo (1990) also described the special rights provided to the Malay community 
as the government's "preferential treatment" to the Malays. He wrote that " in the first 
decade or so after Independence, the expansion of the Malay middle class mainly 
involved enhanced educational opportunities, recruitment quotas into the state 
machinery, and other types of ' preferential treatment '. But as the Malay middle class 
grew, it began to demand even more support for further expansion, especially into the 
'commanding heights' of big business" (Jomo, 1990, p143). Pressure from this group led 
the government to set up a trust agency, Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) and establish a 
Malay bank, Bank Bumiputera in the 1960s. MARA was responsible for setting up small 
business projects in trade, industry and transportation. The hope was to encourage 
greater Malay participation in these fields by selling these companies to the Malays when 
these companies became viable. Bank Bumiputera, meanwhile, was established to 
provide the financial thrust, assisting the Malays through easier access to credit facilities 
and bank loans (Gomez, 1990). 
The Malaysian economic development of the 1960s had not only maintained, 
but probably increased income inequality, including the income gaps between the major 
ethnic groups in Malaysia10 . When the Alliance lost ground to the opposition parties in 
IO . 
Jomo (1990) stated that the mcome distribution in Malaysia worsened between 1957 and 1970, with 
the rich become richer and the poor becoming poorer in all ethnic groups. The deteriorating socio-
economic and political situation of the 1960s came to be interpreted and seen primarily in ethnic terms. 
11 
the General Election in 1969, the opposition parties stirred anti-Malay riots which 
erupted into two days of bloody violence, known as the May 13 riots. This incident 
resulted in a major revision of government ideology, and the implementation of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), with two main objectives of fighting poverty and granting the 
Malays a more equitable share of economic benefits. The NEP restructured the 
Malaysian economy and eliminated the identification of race with economic activity. It 
encouraged the urbanization of Malays and increased their participation in industry and 
commerce. Within the context of continued open capitalist development, the 
restructuring efforts are largely aimed at increasing the share ofbumiputera capital, as 
well as the number ofbumiputera businessmen and professionals (Jomo, 1990). 
The decade following the inception of the NEP marked a new era of political 
involvement in business. Many bumiputera trust agencies11 were established to acquire 
corporate assets on behalf of the companies. The state' s increasing incorporation of 
public enterprises was aimed at elevating the economic status of the bumiputera. 
However, the upsurge in political business became significant only in the 1980' s. When 
Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad assumed office as Malaysia's 4th Prime Minister in 
July of 1981, the phenomenon of "politics in business" entered a more active phase. 
While he was firmly committed to the ideals of the NEP, specifically of its use of public 
enterprises and trust agencies to acquire assets on behalf of the bumiputera, he also 
believed that this alone was not enough. His rationale was that the creation of a Malay 
entrepreneurial community is vital to ensure that when assets acquired by the state are 
11 
such as Perbadanan Nasional Berhad, or National Corporation Limited (Pernas), and Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad, or National Investment Limited (PNB). 
12 
eventually handed over to bumiputera, they would possess the skills to maintain and 
develop their hold on these assets. 
The 1980's corporate aggression of UMNO's investment arm, Fleet Holdings, 
exemplified Mahathir's vision of how Bumiputera could actively participate in business. 
After being put through a complicated series of share-swaps, takeovers, and mergers, 
but not before coming dangerously close to bankruptcy during the mid- l 980s recession, 
Fleet Holdings became the holding company of one of Malaysia's largest 
conglomerates12 in 1991, public-listed Renong Bhd. Through an intriguing network of 
cross-holdings that involved a number of private and public-listed companies, the once-
ailing Renong, led by a group of young, educated, and qualified Bumiputera executives, 
had obtained effective control over the media, construction, and financial sectors by mid-
1991 (Gomez, 1991a). 
Political party involvement in business is not unique to this part of the world. In 
Indonesia, three political parties13 had established business enterprises in the 1950' s. 
However, the rise of military rule and the subsequent suppression of these parties led to 
the cessation of their involvement in business (Robison, 1986). Political involvement in 
business in South Korea is less direct. A corporate group in South Korea known as 
chaebol1 4 is also nurtured and guided by the government, and receives government 
12 Other major conglomerates controlled by Bumiputera with close ties to the ruling elite have also 
grm.vn rapidly. These conglomerates developed by Bumiputera businessmen were seldom initiated or 
ex--panded through active involvement in manufacturing production, but rather by consolidation through 
publicly listed vehicles. 
13 
, i.e. Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI), Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) and Majlis Syuro Muslimin 
(Masyumi). 
14 Appelbaum and Henderson (1992) described the chaebol arrangement as " a narrow development 
alliance between the military regime and select large merchant capitalists that eventually shaped the 
capital accumulation process during the period of export-oriented industrialization "(Appelbaum and 
Henderson. 1992, pl25). 
13 
privileges. Nonetheless, it cannot be considered as a politically-affiliated business group 
since it consists of independent manufacturing firms merged into a large conglomerate. 
Yoshihara (1988) claimed that the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia 
often managed to get easy access to bank loans provided by government-controlled 
banks and access to bank loans through their political influence. He further added that 
those with strong government connections often manage to obtain big loans for 
government projects. In truth, most of the projects undertaken by the political group are 
government privatization projects and of national importance, such as the construction of 
the North-South Highway, which allows a smooth flow of commerce and transportation 
between the northern tip to the southern tip of Malaysia, and allows new satellite towns 
to form along the highway. The projects are in line with the government New Economic 
Policy plan, which has the primary aim of lifting the bumiputera out of poverty and into 
parity with the country's other races, and has the secondary aim of achieving an 
industrialized nation status by year 2020. Ho (1993) pointed out that since government 
projects have to be given national importance, the central bank waived single borrower 
lending limits to ensure that government projects would not be dependent on either 
foreign partners or foreign funds. Thus in order to avoid relying on foreign funds and 
eventually creating a negative impact on the balance-of-payment, bank loans from 
government owned bank and other commercial banks have been made easily available to 
the politically-affiliated business group. 
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Theoretical and Empirical Review on the Corporate Grouping in Japan 
In Japan the concentration of economic power has led to the existence of 
influential groups of enterprises. The most well-known of these groups in the pre-1940 
era were the zaibatsu. The zaibatsu, literally financial cliques, evolved into instruments 
of excessive power that played a part in driving Japan into the Second World War. They 
were the forerunners of today's industrial groupings in Japan15. 
By the early 1960s, many of the companies previously associated with each of 
the four major ex-zaibatsu had reestablished shareholding ties with one another, and 
reintegrated as enterprise groups known by the name of"keiretsu16". The development 
from zaibatsu to keiretsu highlights two points. First, in the pre-war zaibatsu the links in 
the enterprise groups were centered on the commercial sector of their businesses. 
Second, the pre-war zaibatsu took the form of"family konzerns" linked vertically and 
topped by a holding company for the whole group. On the other hand, the post-war 
keiretsu are centered around financial institutions, and take the form of konzerns in 
which the enterprises are linked horizontally17 • Banks were and still are the major nexus 
of interlocking shareholding in these "financial keiretsu." Besides the progeny of the big 
four, i.e., Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Fuyo (formerly Yasuda), the six major 
keiretsu include the Dai-Ichi Kangyo group consisting mainly of former members of the 
15 
In 1948, the U.S. Occupation authorities dissolved the zaibatsu shareholding interlocks. Its main 
purpose was to assure that a fonner enemy would never again become a threat to world peace, and it 
achieved this purpose by disbanding the military and eliminating the industrial forces that had supported 
it, i.e. the zaibatsu. At about the same time, the Japanese legislature passed the Supreme Commander for 
Allied Powers (SCAP)-devised Antimonopoly Law {AML) which made holding companies illegal 
(Miyashita and Russell, 1994). 
16 
keiretsu means "a closely tied complex of industrial and financial corporations". 
17 
see Miyashita et.al, (1994) p55 . 
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smaller Kawasaki and Furukawa zaibatsu, and the Sanwa group which has no prewar 
antecedent. Each of the six groups is respectively linked together through interlocking 
shareholdings and through ties of trade and credit, and the largest members of each are 
represented in the six respective monthly "presidents' council" meetings18 . 
The two major classifications19 ofkeiretsu are the horizontal keiretsu and the 
vertical keiretsu. The horizontal keiretsu revolves around a financial core, which always 
includes a major bank. There are six largest city banks (i.e., Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Sakura, 
Sumitomo, Fuji, Sanwa, and Mitsubishi) and a leading long-term credit bank, the 
Industrial Bank of Japan, which are commonly referred to as the center of their own 
industrial group. In Japan, the keiretsu led by these six city banks have a special name, 
the roku dai kigyo shudan, or Six Big Industrial Groups. In English, they are simply the 
Big Six. At the center of a horizontal keiretsu there is always a nominal "flagship", which 
is the city bank. However, there is often another behemoth - a trading company (shosha) 
- which is roughly equivalent to the bank in influence, sailing right beside it. There may 
even be a third firm, a giant manufacturer, also in this nucleus of the convoy. Around 
these two or three giants circle the core members, usually three financial firms, and one 
18 Today 's industrial groupings have long since surpassed the pre-war zaibatsu in economic importance. 
Their political influence is strong, though not comparable to that of pre-war zaibatsu families . About 
1,000 of the most successful Japanese companies are members of the 17 largest industrial groups. In 
1985, these 17 groups accounted for 27 percent of the aggregate paid-up capital, 25 percent of the 
annual turnover and 9 percent (2.9 million) of the employees of all Japanese companies (Eli, 1991). 
19 
There are various ways to classify a keiretsu, but the two most common classifications are the yoko (or 
horizontal), and the tale (or the vertical). A horizontal keiretsu refers to a group of very large companies 
with common ties to a powerful bank, united by shareholdings, trading relations, and so on. A vertical 
or pyramid keiretsu is made up of one very large company and hundreds or thousands of small 
companies subservient to it. 
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or two very large manufacturers. Together the financial firms, the trading company, and 
the group ' s key manufacturers give the keiretsu its identity. 
In Malaysia, a similar kind of horizontal relationship exists within the political 
group. However, unlike in Japan where the relationship revolves around a financial core, 
the horizontal relationship in the politically-affiliated business group revolves around a 
few holding companies20 which are directly owned by the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO), Malaysia' s dominant political party headed by Datuk Seri Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister. The politically-affiliated business group is 100 
percent bumiputera-controlled thus it is well-placed to take advantage of government's 
privatization schemes. They have stakes in several large companies with synergistic 
potential, such as stakes in large construction firms, materials manufacturing firms, 
cement manufacturers and several commercial banks. These large companies, together 
make up the horizontal relationship which is similar to that of the horizontal keiretsu in 
Japan. 
To a large extent, the vertical relationship in keiretsu overlaps the horizontal 
relationship. That is, many of the biggest vertical keiretsu lie inside the borders of the Big 
Six. Almost all the Big Six companies are also the heads of their own vertical companies. 
There is also a similar vertical relationship that exists within the politically-affiliated 
business group in Malaysia. Each of the large key manufacturers and subsidiaries of the 
holding companies are also heads of their own vertical companies. For example, beneath 
United Engineers Malaysia (UEM), which is a large public-listed construction firm 
20 One of the holding companies, Renong, is now controlled by investors closely allied to UMNO 
leaders. 
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owned by Renong, are other listed and non-listed firms. Four of the subsidiaries are listed 
on the Main Board of the KLSE. [n the case of a construction company such as UEM, 
most of the subsidiaries are firms manufacturing products for the parent company. All of 
these companies produce some part or subassembly which ultimately works its way up 
the pipeline to benefit the company at the top of the pyramid. This relationship is similar 
to the vertical relationship in the keiretsu21 . 
Thus, the political group in Malaysia has horizontal and vertical relationships 
similar in spirit to those of the Japanese keiretsu. The relationship revolves around a 
holding company. It has government-owned banks that provide financing, and large key 
manufacturers that complete the nucleus of the group. However, while the main bank 
provides the main lending to the keiretsu firms, in the politically-affiliated group, 
government-owned banks and commercial banks are the main lenders. 
The Japanese keiretsu also has the distinct characteristic of firms bailing out 
other firms in period of financial distress. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) found 
that group firms are helped in times of financial distress, not because it is efficient to help 
them out, but simply because the group is unwilling to let one of its members fail22. 
There is a similar case of firms bailing out other firms in period of financial 
distress within the political group in Malaysia. One of the companies in the group, Faber, 
was saddled with accumulated debt in early 1990 but was bailed out by another company 
2 1 (See Chart 1 for an example of horizontal and vertical relationships within the political business 
group). 
22 
Hoshi et al. ,. suggested several reasons for this. Firstly, bankruptcy reflects badly on other group 
finns; secondly, the managers of other group firms feel a personal loyalty to the managers of the 
troubled company; thirdly, the bank executives are reluctant to admit that they made a mistake in 
extending credit. 
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in the group, Fleet Holdings23 . Firms in the group are known to help out other firms in 
periods of financial distress. Even during a period of recession in the mid-1980 ' s, these 
firms managed to sustain the financial turbulence unlike the independent firms. 
Profitability Performance 
In neoclassical economic theory, the objective of the firm is to maximize profits 
or market value. Under this framework, the objective of corporate groupings must be to 
maximize profits or market value of the member firms collectively. However, 
econometric analyses of financial performance data on large Japanese manufacturing 
firms have consistently reported negative effects related to group affiliation, and the 
hypothesis of joint profit maximization cannot be applied to corporate groupings 
(Nakatani, 1984). Nakatani24 stressed that keiretsu groups in Japan has historically been 
under little pressure to maximize profit25 . Their shares are largely held by one another, 
and the group banks supplying the bulk of their financing have long-term growth. 
Nakatani believes such strategies are driven by the Japanese firm' s long- term 
employment obligations to its workforce. He also found group firms exhibiting greater 
profit stability and paying higher wages than independent firms. Nakatani found profit 
rate for group affiliated firms, on average, is significantly lower than that of independent 
23 
24 
see Gomez (1990), from page 83 to page 85. 
Nakatani (1984) classified a manufacturing firm as affiliated with a keiretsu if, for three consecutive 
years, more than 40 percent of the firm 's total debt was borrowed from financial institutions of the 
keiretsu and 20 percent of the firm's stock was held within the keiretsu, or if historically, it was 
~~iat~ with the keiretsu as, for instance, by long membership in the keiretsu presidents ' council. 
He COnJectured that the formation ofkeiretsu group increased the monopoly power of respective 
members, but the monopoly power was utilized in the pursuit of a desired mode of distribution of output, 
as well as in stabilization of corporate performance over time. 
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finns and they have lower growth rates, but the variability of both the growth rate and 
profit rate of the group affiliated firms is much smaller than that of the independent 
Weinstein and Y afeh27 ( 1994) showed that corporate groups in Japan do not 
earn higher profitability and growth, but the close bank-firm ties increase the availability 
of capital when access to bond and equity markets is limited. They presented two main 
reasons for the failure of corporate groups to perform better than other firms. First, 
banks, as major debt-holders, are likely to be more risk averse than other equity holders. 
Second, in return for the provision of capital and other services, banks are able to extract 
rents from their client firms so as to offset any gains they may have over other firms. 
Banks enjoy more market power when firms do not have easy access to other sources of 
finance, and therefore can charge higher interest rates in exchange for liquidity services 
and influence firms to avoid risky but profitable projects. They further demonstrated that 
the liberalization of financial markets is important in reducing the market power of banks 
by enhancing the contestability of financial markets. 
One of the major purposes of setting up the politically-affiliated business group 
in Malaysia is to create more bumiputera entrepreneurs. Initially, government 
corporations were formed28 to provide loans and business opportunities to burniputera 
small businesses. However, according to Jomo ( 1993), 
26 Nak ·1 · ataru c aimed that this is consistent with the hypothesis that the keiretsu member firms are not 
profit maximizers, and is also consistent with the stability of performance hypothesis which indicates a 
nsk-averse concept 
2
; David E. Weinst~in and Yishay Yafeh (1995) examined the effects of a bank centered financial 
system on firm performance in Japan 3 . 
such as Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) which was formed in the early 1960s, and 
Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA) which was formed in 1965. 
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"These 'infant' industries were not being forced or induced to grow up. There 
was little pressure to transfer technology or skills. There was admittedly some growth. .. 
but it was small. "29 
However, the introduction of the NEP in the 1970 and subsequently, the switch 
from infant industries to export-oriented industries30 gave a new impetus for industrial 
growth. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister, the government adopted the 'Look 
East Policy31' which emphasized heavy industrialization. The politically-affiliated 
business group was set up to take advantage of the government industrialization program 
and to encourage more bumiputera participation in business. Nevertheless, the World 
economic crisis in the middle of the 1980s had a major impact on the Malaysian 
economy32, and particularly on the politically-affiliated business group. This was because 
the politically-affiliated business group was involved in large investments with large 
capital outlays, and due to the economic recession, affected the profitability performance 
29 Jomo (1993, p24) 
30 According to Jomo (1993), "the new emphasis on export-oriented industries was supported by the 
NEP's commitment to modernizing Malaysia's open capitalist economy. Increasing local (including 
state) ownership of productive assets, especially in primary production, and even reduced foreign 
ownership of productive assets, especially in primary production, and even reduced foreign ownership 
of industry were no longer considered incompatible with further integration and profitable participation 
in the world economy .. . Various new measures - notably the establishment of Free Trade Zones from the 
early 1970s - were introduced to facilitate and encourage Malaysian manufacturing production for 
export .. " (Jomo, 1993, p25) 
31 The 'Look-East' policy was established in the mid-1980s as a campaign to boost productivity, by 
inducing hard work and promoting more effective models of labor discipline associated with the 
Japanese. It was also seen as a fairly wide-ranging series of initiatives to become a 'newly 
industrializing country' (NIC) by emulating the Japanese and South Korean 'economic miracles' The 
real thrust of the campaign was the promotion of labor discipline through organizing industrial relations 
to promote company loyalty (e.g. in-house unions), increase productivity (e.g. through better work 
ethics), and reduce losses (e.g. quality control circles, 'zero defect ' groups). Perhaps the similarities 
between the Japanese keiretsu and the political business group are not by chance, but rather by design. ft 
could be that the political business group was established with the 'Look-East' policy as the guideline, 
that is, to form a business group that resembles the Japanese keiretsu group. 
32 T . 
o examine the Malaysian economic impact on the political business group, the period of study of 
this dissertation is divided into two periods. The first period is from 1985 to 1989, which is also the post 
recession period, and the second period is from 1990 to 1994, which is the post NEP period. 
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of the group. The first period of my study, that is from 1985 to 1989, is the post 
recession period. It is also a period of 'turning around' for most businesses, since "by the 
end of the 1980s, the industrial sector in Malaysia was once again expanding at a rapid 
rate33• " 
Statistics on the corporate groups in Japan show a lower profitability and 
growth rate compared to independent firms (Nakatani, 1984; Weinstein and Yafeh, 
1995). However, due to the recession in the middle 1980s, the profitability performance 
of the politically-affiliated business group may not be any different than that of the 
independent group during the first five-year study period, that is from 1985 to 1989, 
since most businesses were only starting to pick up the pieces left from the recession 
period. Nonetheless, the second five-year period of the study may witness some 
differences in profitability performance, since most of government privatization34 projects 
took place during this period (See Appendix 2 for a summary of privatization projects 
and forms of privatization). 
33 
see Jomo (1993 , p 34). 
34 Privatization in Malaysia officially began in 1983, well after Mahathir had taken over as Prime 
Minister in 1981. Unlike the 'Look East' policy and the 'Malaysia Incorporated ' concept -also 
associated with Mahathir 's administration -which appear to have faded in significance by the mid-
1980s, privatization has achieved a new vigor, especially with support, encouragement and advice from 
powerful international agencies, and the economic downturn of 1985-86 (Jomo, 1990, p212). 
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Investment Decisions and Financing Behavior35 
Meyer and Kuh (1957) provided three theories of investment, i.e. the marginal 
theories, the acceleration principle, and the institutional-empirical approaches36. Their 
empirical results suggest the importance of internal liquidity in making investment 
decisions. During 1928 and 1949 when economic conditions in the United States 
stabilized or declined in several lines activity, the two liquidity measures, i.e. profits and 
depreciation expense, provided the best explanation of investment future outlay. High 
liquidity signals that the firm has done well and is likely to continue doing well. Thus, 
more liquid firms have better investment opportunities, and they tend to invest more. 
In a spirit similar to Meyer and Kuh, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990), 
focused on liquidity to predict the investment behavior of the corporate group and 
independent group in Japan. They adopted Nakatani's (1984) criterion for identifying 
keiretsu members and nonmembers and for exploring differences in the investment 
behavior between the two classes. They argued that keiretsu banks have strong 
incentives to become informed about their firms and their investment opportunities, and 
that they use the information to ensure that efficient choices are made. The reason is that 
the banks, besides being lenders to the firms, are also important stockholders with 
representation on the board of directors. They presented evidence consistent with the 
35 
There are three methods of financing an investment project. A finn can either raise funds by, i) 
issuing debentures or shares, which is the direct financing method since it obtains funds directly from 
the public; or ii) obtaining loans from some financial institutions, which is the indirect financing 
method, since the financial institutions stand between the public, the providers of the funds, and the 
firm, the source of demand for funds ; or iii) obtaining fund internally, that is, out of depreciation funds 
and retained profits. 
36 M di see eyer and Kuh ( 1957), chapter II for a complete seussion of the three modern theories of 
investments. 
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view that information and incentive problems37 in the capital market have important 
effects on corporate investment. Their evidence came from the fact that investment by 
firms, with a close relationship to a bank is much less sensitive to their liquidity than 
firms raising their capital through more arms-length transactions. 
Hoshi et al.,. interpreted their findings as evidence that group financing 
arrangements relax liquidity constraints on group-affiliated firms. Yoshihara (1988) also 
provided a similar interpretation for the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia. 
Firms in the politically-affiliated business group are less liquidity constrained than 
independent firms because financing is provided by government-owned banks. 
Furthermore, commercial banks are also under political pressure to provide loans to 
firms in the politically-affiliated business group, while the central bank was reported to 
have waived single borrower lending lirnits38 . This sort of financing arrangement not only 
removes the dependency on either foreign funds or foreign partners, it also offers firms in 
the politically-affiliated business group an important competitive advantage. 
37
The capital market models suggest that due to information problems in the market, more liquid firms 
should invest more. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that incentive problems raise the cost of 
external finance. Outside financing dilutes management's ownership stake, thereby inducing incentive 
problems since managers control the firm but do not own it. Myers and Majluf ( 1984) stressed that 
information problems, rather than incentive problems, that will raise the cost of external finance . Both 
reached a similar conclusion that since it is more attractive for fim1s to finance investment with internal 
funds, for firn1s facing incentive and information problems, liquidity will be an important determinant 
of investment. 
38 . 
see Jacqueline Ho, Malaysian Business, October 1, 1993, pl4. 
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Summary 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the issues of profitability 
performance, investment and capital structure behavior of the firms in the politically-
affiliated business group in Malaysia, and to compare their performance with that of 
firms in the independent group. Thus the objective of this chapter is to discuss the 
development of theory of corporate grouping developed for the Japanese keiretsu and 
relate this to the politically affiliated corporate grouping in Malaysia. 
This chapter discusses the Malaysian political involvement in business, and 
adopts the theory that relates it to the Japanese corporate grouping to explain the 
behavior of politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia. The first section discusses 
the New Economic Policy and political involvement in business in Malaysia. The second 
section reviews the literature on the corporate grouping in Japan. The third section 
discusses similarities and differences in corporate structure between the Japanese 
keiretsu and the Malaysian politically-affiliated business group. 
There are several similar characteristics possessed by the Japanese keiretsu and 
the Malaysian political group. First, like the two relationship classifications of the 
Japanese keiretsu, the relationships within the political group in Malaysia can also be 
classified into horizontal and vertical relationships. The horizontal relationship revolves 
around a holding company, it has government-owned banks that provide the financing, 
and large key manufacturers that complete the nucleus of the group. However, while the 
main bank provides the main lending to the keiretsu firms in Japan, the government-
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owned banks and other commercial banks in the politically-affiliated business group in 
Malaysia are the main lenders. The vertical relationship in the politically-affiliated 
business group exists in the form of large key manufacturers and other subsidiaries of the 
holding companies owning firms that manufacture products for the parent company. All 
of these companies produce some part or subassembly which ultimately works its way up 
the pipeline to benefit the company at the top of the pyramid. 
Perhaps the similarity should not surprise anyone if he or she understood the 
prime minister's "Look-East" policy in the early 1980's (see footnote 34) . The "Look 
East" policy of the prime minister was aimed towards industrializing the country 
following the "Japanese way of doing business". A host of Dr. Mahathir "looking East" 
policy initiatives include heavy industrialization, the preference for 'turn-key project' 
arrangement, and the Malaysian car project. He further emphasized that the main thrust 
in "looking East" involved the inculcation of Japanese-style work ethics, mainly referring 
to efforts to increase productivity through harder work and greater loyalty to the 
company. Thus "sogo-shosha" was the main theme for this group during the past decade. 
The second similarity lies with the fact that both the keiretsu group and the 
politically-affiliated business group are not liquidity constrained. Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharsftein (1990) found that group financing arrangements in Japan relax liquidity 
constraints for the group-affiliated firms. Yoshihara (1988) also provided similar 
interpretation for the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia. Firms in the 
politically-affiliated business group are less liquidity constrained than independent firms 
because financing is provided by government-owned banks. 
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The third similarity is that, like their Japanese counterpart, firms in the 
Malaysian politically-affiliated business group also bail out one another in periods of 
financial distress. 
Nevertheless, there are several issues which may differentiate the characteristics 
of the Japanese keiretsu and the politically-affiliated business group. If the nucleus of the 
group in the Japanese counterpart centers around a main bank, the nucleus of the 
politically-affiliated business group centers around a holding company with very close to 
the United Malays National Organization, UMNO, a ruling political party. Furthermore, 
Nakatani (1984) found significantly lower profit and growth rates for group affiliated 
firms, but on average, the variability of profit and growth rates are also much smaller, 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1994) showed that the corporate groups in Japan do not earn 
higher profitability or generate greater growth. These are some of the underlying issues 
that this study hopes to examine for the politically-affiliated business group and to 
compare with the independent group in Malaysia. In other words, like the Japanese 
corporate group, does the politically-affiliated business group earn lower profits and 
achieve lower growth rates than the independent group in Malaysia? Would its 
investment decisions and financing behavior be different than that of the independent 
group? The next chapter will discuss the hypotheses developed for this study. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
THE HYPOTHESES 
Introduction 
The review of previous studies demonstrates that there are several evidence on 
the behavior of corporate groupings. For instance, while group affiliation is negatively 
related to profits, the variability of profits is also much lower in group affiliated firms 
than independent firms [Nakatani (1984), Demsetz and Lehn (1985)]. On the issue of 
investment and financing decisions, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) argued that 
liquidity is less constrained in group-affiliated firms compared to independent firms, 
based on Meyer and Kuh's (1957) contention that liquidity is an important determinant 
of investment. 
The objective of this study is to test the preferential treatment hypothesis based 
on the theory of corporate grouping. There are three issues to be examined here, i.e. , the 
profitability performance, the investment decision, and the financing behavior. These 
three issues will be examined to compare the difference between politically-affiliated 
business group and independent group. The first section of this chapter will formulate the 
three main hypotheses for the study. The second section will discuss the dependent and 
independent variables. The last section summarizes the chapter. 
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Profitability Performance, Investment Decision and Financing Decision 
Over the past several years, Malaysia' economy has grown at an annual rate 
exceeding eight percent. Behind the strong performance of private industry is increased 
government spending. According to the Economic Report of 1994/1995 issued by the 
Ministry of Finance, public investment in 1994 increased by 29 percent from RM21 ,426 
million in 1993 to RM27,635 million with the implementation of Sixth Malaysia Plan 
(6MP) projects which gathers momentum towards the end of its plan period (Economic 
Report, 1995). The bulk of the government mega projects are most often be awarded to 
the politically-affiliated business group firms, since this group not only is 100% 
bumiputera-controlled, it is also closely affiliated with the ruling party. Thus this group 
often gets preferential treatment whenever it comes to government-awarded contracts39. 
The literature review reports inconclusive results on the relation between 
profitability performance and corporate groupings. N akatani ( 1984) reported that profit 
rate is lower for affiliated firms than independent firms and he found support in 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) and Prowse (1990). Nakatani (1984) found that not only are 
profit and growth rates lower for group affiliated firms in Japan, but their variability in 
profit and growth rates are also much lower. Thus he concluded that affiliated firms seek 
to stabilize profits and growth over time. This is consistent with Weinstein and Yafeh 
(1995) who suggested that the reason the profit rate is lower for the affiliated firms is 
because banks, as the major lender, are risk averse, thus banks prefer less risky projects 
with lower returns than risky projects with higher returns. However, even though 
39 
see Yoshihara (1988), page 125 . 
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Prowse (1992) found a lower profit rate for group-affiliated firms compared to 
independent firms in Japan, he found no difference in the volatility of asset returns 
between these two groups. 
On the contrary, the Malaysian politically-affiliated business group may not 
have lower profit and growth rates than independent group. Since 1970, the government 
has pursued a policy aimed at stimulating economic growth in order to lift the Malays 
out of poverty and into parity with the country's other races. Thus, the preferential 
treatment given by the government may stimulate growth and develop Bumiputera 
entrepreneurship. Consequently, the assertion is that profit and growth rates for the 
politically-affiliated group will be higher than independent group. 
Kester (1986) suggested that information effects favor relatively higher leverage 
in Japan. His argument is based on a previous finding by Myer and Majluf ( 1984). Myer 
and Majluf showed that if there is an asymmetry of information, then companies with 
favorable prospects tend to have higher leverage ratios. These companies rely more on 
internal financing and the issuance of safe securities to avoid the underpricing of an 
otherwise valuable project. Alternatively, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) showed 
that liquidity, i.e., the availability of internal funds, should be an important determinant of 
investment when there are information problems in the capital market. They found that 
firms with close ties to a Japanese main bank (i.e., a bank that serves as their primary 
source of external financing and thus is likely to be well informed about the firm), are 
less liquidity constrained than firms with weaker links to a main bank. 
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The politically-affiliated business group is often involved in projects of national 
importance and they tend to get easy access to bank loans from commercial banks and 
government-owned banks, since, according to Yoshihara (1988), banks in Malaysia are 
under heavy political pressure to extend loans to the political group. 
Yoshihara ( 1988) claimed that the politically-affiliated business group in 
Malaysia managed to get easy access to loans provided by government-controlled banks 
and private loans through their political influence. Therefore, intuitively, firms in the 
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia are less liquidity constrained than 
independent firms. Based on Yoshihara' s assertion, it is my conjecture that the 
politically-affiliated business group is less liquidity constrained simply because of political 
patronage or preferential treatment rather than of information asymmetry. Additionally, 
through political influence, the politically-affiliated business group not only manages to 
get easy access to loans provided by government-controlled banks (i.e., which may 
determine its financing decision), it is often the largest beneficiary of government 
projects (i.e., which may subsequently determine its investment decision). 
Hypothesis 
The hypotheses of this study are as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS I : Given that the firms in the politically-affiliated business group in 
Malaysia obtain preferential treatment from the government, they are more likely to 
venture into profitable projects, thus this study may observe higher profitability 
performance for the politically-affiliated group. On the other hand, these projects are also 
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of national importance and meant for public consumptio~ thus, return from government 
projects may be small but stable. The preferential treatment hypothesis predicts that the 
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia not only has superior profitability 
performance measures compared to independent group, it also predicts that the 
determinants of profitability performance for the group are different than independent 
group. 
HYPOTHESIS II : Given that the country is gearing itself towards achieving a 
developed country status, government spending is increasing at a rapid rate. Thus, the 
preferential treatment hypothesis predicts that the politically-affiliated business group in 
Malaysia has higher investment measure compared to that of the independent group. 
Consistently, since the politically-affiliated business group is often involved in 
government privatization plans and the building of the infrastructure for the natio~ its 
investment decisions are basically being determined by politicians. Thus the preferential 
treatment hypothesis predicts that the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia 
exhibits different investment behavior pattern compared to independent group. 
HYPOTHESIS III : Given that firms in the politically-affiliated business group are 
closely affiliated to the ruling party, they get easy access to bank loans and loans from 
government owned banks. In order to avoid reliance on foreign funds, commercial 
banks in Malaysia are under political pressure to extend loans to firms in the politically-
affiliated business group. The preferential treatment hypothesis predicts that firms in the 
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia are less liquidity constrained, and since 
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they prefer to raise loans to finance their investments, have a different financing behavior 
pattern than firms in the independent group. 
The Explanatory Variables 
Liquidity (LIQ) 
Previous study found group-affiliated firms in Japan to be less liquidity 
constrained than independent firms [Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharf stein ( 1991)]. Hoshi, et 
al., provided some evidence which suggests that liquidity is an important determinant of 
investment, and more so for independent firms than for group-affiliated firms. Thus, 
when liquidity is high, a firm will utilize internal funds to invest in profitable projects 
rather than raising capital through loans. Additionally, there will be lesser need for 
outside financing. This indicates a negative relation between liquidity and financing. 
Meyer and Kuh (1957), who pioneered the study of liquidity effects on 
investment, used the stock of net quick liquidity, i.e., current assets less inventory and 
current liabilities, as a liquidity measure. They found that liquidity is an important 
determinant for investment. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) used two measures 
of liquidity. The first was a cash flow measure, which is income after tax plus 
(accounting) depreciation less dividend payments. The second was the stock of liquid 
assets measure, which is the level of short-term securities at the beginning of the period. 
Since firms in the politically-affiliated business group are often involved in 
projects of national importance, they get preferential treatment in obtaining bank loans 
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from government-controlled banks and commercial banks. Thus I expect firms in the 
politically-affiliated business group to be less liquidity constrained than independent 
firms. 
On the issue of the relationship between liquidity and investment decisions, I 
expect liquidity to be positively related to investment decisions for independent firms but 
not for firms in politically-affiliated business group, since independent firms will have to 
rely more on the availability of liquidity in order to make future investment plans, while 
firms in the politically-affiliated business group do not. 
Liquidity should also be negatively related to financing since based on pecking 
order theory, firms with high liquidity will tend to choose internal funds for investment 
purposes, rather than raising outside financing. Additionally, based on the same theory, I 
expect a positive relation between liquidity measures and profitability measures. 
Risk measures 
I use three measurements of risk. Two measures to proxy for operating risk, 
and one to proxy for the systematic risk of an investment. The traditional theory of 
relating risk and rate of return assumes that most stockholders are risk averters, and 
therefore require a higher return, i.e., risk premium, for taking on more risk. Under this 
"risk premium hypothesis", earning volatility should be positively related to return. 
Earnings volatility is expected to be negatively related to leverage ratio since 
high-earnings volatility implies a higher probability of financial distress occurring. 
However, previous studies found a positive relation between leverage and operating risk 
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[Myers (1977); Kim and Sorensen (1986); and Chang and Rhee (1990)], while Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984) and Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) found a negative relation 
between risk and leverage. 
On the issue of whether the politically-affiliated business group has higher risk 
measures compared to independent firms, prior discussion leads me to believe that firms 
in the political group are seldom involved in high risk projects. Thus, it is uncommon to 
find firms in the politically-affiliated business group who suffer from liquidation 
problems. However, due to the close group affiliation, even if the probability of 
bankruptcy exists among these firms, other firms will step in to bail out firms in financial 
distress. 
According to Nakatani (1984), firms in the keiretsu group have lower profits 
and growth compared to the independent group, but their variability of profits and 
growth are much lower. This is due to fact that keiretsu firms moved towards achieving 
long-term stability. We can observe a similar scenario in Malaysia, whereby the 
horizontal and vertical relations that exist between firms in the political group should 
ensure long-term business stability. Nevertheless, I believe not only does political 
patronage ensure the long term financial stability of this group, but also that the 
corporate expertise of these group firms has lead to the rise in business fortunes for this 
politically-affiliated business group. Thus I expect operating risk to be lower for 
politically-affiliated group than for independent group. 
The expected return on a risky asset should be dependent only on that asset 's 
systematic risk. Since beta indicates how the individual stock return moves with the 
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market, if beta is less than l , then it will indicate that the stock is generally less risky than 
the market and if it is more than 1, then this will indicate that the stock is generally 
riskier than other stocks in the market. The price of a stock reflects an investor's overall 
expectation of the value of the stock. In other words, the risk measurement indicates 
how investors view the stock return performance of a firm. Do investors regard the 
politically-affiliated business group as a riskier investment than the market? 
Under the "risk premium hypothesis", this study expects the risk measures to be 
positively related to return. Based on previous assertion that high operating risk firms 
tend to use higher debt, this study expects a positive relation between risk and leverage. 
Firm Size 
In economics literature, market-structure factors play an important role in 
determining firm's profits. As suggested by Bain (1956), firm size can be regarded as a 
sort of "capital requirement" banier of entry. Additionally, Baumol (1959) argued that 
large firms have greater access to capital and have higher profits. As the capital-cost 
aspects of an entry barrier, firm size is expected to be positively related to profitability. 
On the other hand, size and profitability may be negatively related owing to x-efficiency 
or diseconomies of scale. X-efficiencies is referred to as the inefficiency caused by poor 
management with internal slack or waste. This argument is equivalent to Jensen and 
Meckling' s ( 197 6) agency-cost argument. According to Jensen and Meckling, the larger 
the firm size, the higher the agency cost, thus, low profitability is expected. Therefore the 
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net impact of firm size on profitability depends on the trade-off between the positive 
effect of an entry barrier and the negative effect caused by agency problems. 
The firm size effect has received wide attention in both the popular and 
academic financial literature. Reinganum ( 1981) and Banz ( 1981) found that small firms, 
on average, yield higher returns compared to large firms. Using time-series data, Fama 
and French (1992b) found firm size to have strong explanatory power of average cross-
sectional stock returns. Consistently, Fazilah (1996) also observed a small firm size effect 
in Malaysia. She found that small firms on average obtain higher risk-adjusted rates of 
return than large firms. Market-adjusted returns are also used as an alternative measure 
of performance. 
Additionally, Chang and Rhee (1990) found that large, well-established firms 
have easy access to the capital markets, while small, new firms do not. Titman and 
Wessels (1988) provided another explanation for the firm size effect. According to them, 
small firms may be more leveraged than large firms since it is more expensive for small 
firms to issue new equity. Thus, small firms may prefer to obtain short term loans rather 
than issue long term debt because of lower fixed costs associated with this alternative. 
Their results showed that there is a positive relationship between size and debt-to-book 
value of equity. They used the natural logarithm of sales as an indicator of size. 
Based on previous studies, I expect a positive relation between financing 
measure and firm size, and a negative relation between firm size and profitability 
performance. 
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Growth 
Finance and economic researchers have historically agreed that there is a 
positive relationship between firm growth and debt, ceteris paribus. Hurdle ( 197 4) 
contends that if growth is expected to be temporary, stockholders might wish to finance 
through debt to avoid dilution of their control. This argument is consistent with the 
pecking order theory. Rapid growth may imply higher debt capacity and on ability to pay 
interests; lenders may charge a lower cost to the firm with sound future prospects. 
However, from the agency theory framework, Titman and Wessels (1988) 
argued that firms in growing industries suffer higher agency cost of debt due to higher 
opportunities of asset substitution. In addition, growth opportunities are valuable assets 
but they cannot be collateralized, thus Titman and Wessels, consistent with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Myer (1977) and Stulz (1990), suggested a negative relation between 
debt and growth. Consistently, Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1995) also found a strong negative 
relation between leverage and growth. They argued that firms with greater leverage than 
the industry median grow at a rate less than the industry median. 
Additionally, Tobin and Brainard ( 1977) employed a valuation equation which 
relates the current market value (which reflects the expected future cash inflows 
discounted at the appropriate discount rate) to the replacement costs of assets as a 
yardstick against which the market value of firms may be analyzed. By expressing the 
total market value of the firm in relation to the replacement value of the underlying 
assets, called the Tobin' s q ratio, the excess market value of the firm is measured. 
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Tobin's intent was to examine the causal relationship between growth and investment. 
He argued that if, at the margin, q exceeds unity, firms would have an incentive to invest, 
since the value of their new capital investment would exceed it's cost. Thus there should 
be a positive relation between growth and investments. 
I would expect politically-affiliated firms to have higher growth measures than 
independent firms since they have easier access to government-awarded projects, and 
since more growth opportunities are made available to them. On the issue of the relation 
between growth measure and the endogenous variables, based on previous literature, I 
expect a positive relation between the growth measures and investment decisions, and 
between growth measure and financing decisions. 
Industry classification (IC) 
Titman ( 1984) showed that firms that make products requiring the availability 
of specialized servicing and spare parts will find liquidation especially costly. This 
indicates that firms that manufacture machines and equipment should be financed with 
less debt. Previous researchers have found industry classifications a significant predictor 
of financial structure. This implies that the optimal capital structure may vary by industry 
structure. Industry classification can be used as a proxy for business risk. However, 
industry classifications may also act as proxy for other factors affecting capital structure. 
Marsh's ( 1982) results indicated that industry classifications are correlated to asset 
composition, risks, growth and profits. This study classifies firms into three industry 
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classifications, based on the sector groupings from the New Straits Times and KLSE 
Industrial groupings. 
Summary 
The objective of this study is to test the preferential treatment hypothesis. The 
three major measures to be examined are the profitability performance measures, the 
financing measures and the investment measures. This study presents three hypotheses 
which relate to the preferential treatment hypothesis. The first hypothesis is that the 
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia has better profitability performance 
measure being in an affiliated group rather than not. The second hypothesis is that the 
politically-affiliated business group exhibits different investment behavior pattern 
compared to independent group. The third hypothesis is that firms in the politically-
affiliated business group have a different financing behavior pattern than firms in the 
independent group. 
The dependent measures in this study are the profitability performance 
measures, the financing decision measures and the investment decision measures, while 
the independent measures are represented by liquidity, risk, size and growth measures. 
The discussion on the dependent and independent variables lead us to several 
hypotheses. Based on previous studies, this study hypothesizes a positive relationship 
between liquidity measure and the three dependent measures; a positive relationship 
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between risk measures and profitability performance measures, and negative relationship 
between risk and leverage measure; a positive relationship between size and financing 
measure, and a negative relationship between size and profitability measure; and finally, a 
negative relationship between growth and investment and also financing decisions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The Data 
The sample consists of firms classified as either politically-affiliated or 
independent. Politically-affiliated firms are defined as firms with close affiliation with the 
ruling political party, i.e., the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). 
Independent firms are defined as firms which are not affiliated with the ruling party. 
Selection of Politically-Affiliated Business Group 
Firms in the politically-affiliated business group are identified from the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange Handbooks, holding company annual report40, news articles in 
The New Straits Times, The Star Newspapers, The Far Eastern Economics Review, The 
Wall Street Journal, Gomez (1995) and Cheong (1996). From these sources, I managed 
to trace six holding companies which are closely affiliated to the ruling party. 
Next, from company annual reports and from the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange handbooks from 1988 to 1995, I identified forty one subsidiary companies of 
~ -Renong Annual Report, 199). 
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these six holding companies. This gave me a total of forty seven public-listed companies, 
five in the financial industries and forty two in the non-financial industries. However, 
since I only selected non-financial firms with complete data from January 1985 to 
December 1994, the final sample of politically affiliated firms was 3 5. Firms are divided 
into three industrial groups. These industrial groups are based on the sector groupings of 
the New Straits Times and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Industrial grouping. The 
first group contains firms from the consumer products, trading services and hotels 
sectors. The second group contains firms from the industrial products, construction and 
properties sectors, while the third group contains firms from the plantation and mining 
sectors. The final sample of 35 firms consists of23 firms in the first group, 5 firms in the 
second group and 7 firms in the third group. 
Selection of Independent Firms 
The independent firms are selected from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
Handbooks. I traced the ten largest shareholders of the companies, and confirmed that 
none of the independent firms are affiliated to the ruling party nor to the firms in the 
politically-affiliated business group in the form of ownership. 
I included two types of independent firms selections. The first selection contains 
a matching set of independent firms . These firms are matched with firms in the 
politically-affiliated group according to industrial grouping and size. Since the politically-
affiliated group contains 23 firms in the first industrial group, 5 firms in the second 
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industrial group, and 7 firms in the third industrial group, the matching independent 
group also contains equal number of firms in each industrial group, all of equal or almost 
equal size to the politically-affiliated firms in the same industrial groupings. 
The second selection of independent firms contain a set of fully independent 
firms also coming from the same industrial grouping. Since the politically-affiliated 
business group is more concentrated in terms of ownership structure, the second 
selection is based on 3 5 firms from the same industrial group with more diluted 
ownership. The selection of 35 independent firms with diluted ownership is determined 
from the ten largest shareholders from the last three editions of the KLSE handbook, i.e., 
1992, 1993 and 1994. This analysis may provide some contrasting evidence with respect 
to the effect of concentrated ownership on profitability performance, financing decisions 
and investment measures. By selecting fully independent firms, we may be able to 
disentangle the effect of ownership concentration on the three issues under study. 
Berle and Means41 (1932) defined control as the power to select the board of 
directors. They measured ownership as 20 percent or more of voting stocks owned by an 
individual or a group of stockholders. Herman (1982) suggested ownership of 5 percent 
of a firm's common stocks as a benchmark, beyond which ownership is no longer 
negligible. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) also found 'conditions necessary for 
41 The basic argument of Berle and Means is that the modern day corporation have grown so large that a 
few of these control a major proportion of the financial assets of the corporate economy. This increase in 
size has led to a dispersion of share ownership. This phenomenon has resulted in a situation in which 
the 'owner of industrial wealth is left a mere symbol of ownership. while the power, the responsibility 
and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a 
separate group in whose hands lies control' (1932:68). They measured ownership control by the 
ownership of at least 20 percent voting stocks by an individual or a group of stockholders. Control is 
measured simply by the percentage of stocks owned by an individual or group of stockholders. 
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entrenchment .. not much different for firms with greater than 25 percent board 
ownership ' (p. 295). Among the I 00 largest corporations in the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange, Lim ( 1981) found that stock ownership is 'highly concentrated in the hands of 
a few institutions and ultimately, a few wealthy families ' (p . 114). Based on Berle and 
Means definition of ownership control, the second selection of independent firms 
contains firms with less than 20 percent of voting stocks held by an individual or a group 
of stockholders. 
The rational of employing the two independent firm selections is to provide a 
broader analysis of the study. In other words, I may be able to compare the politically-
affiliated business group with not only independent firms of the same sizes and industry 
groupings, but also with independent firms of more diluted ownership. 
Selection of Industrial Grouping 
The selection of industrial grouping is based on the sector groupings from the 
New Straits Times and KLSE Industrial groupings. The business section of the New 
Straits Times classified firms into 11 industries42. Since the politically-affiliated firms can 
only be found in eight of these eleven industries, this study divides these eight industries 
into three industrial groups. Group 1 consists of three industries, i.e., consumer 
products, trading services and hotels; Group 2 consists of three industries, i.e., industrial 
42 i.e., consumer products, industrial products, construction, trading services, infrastructure, finance, 
hotels, properties, plantation, mining and trust (The New Straits Times, October 9, 1996, p3 l ). 
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products, construction and properties; Group 3 consists of two industries, i.e., plantation 
and mining. 
Period of Study 
For the study, the data was separated into two five-year sub-periods. The first 
sub-period is from 1985 to 1989. The second sub-period is from 1990 to 1994. This 
separation was chosen because the New Economic Policy (NEP) ten-year plan ended in 
1990 and the post-NEP era, when government ruling on Bumiputera equity ownership 
was no longer strictly emphasized, began in 1990. 
Additionally, 1990 marks the beginning of the period of government 
privatization plans, thus the two five-year periods before and after post-NEP will provide 
a comparative analysis of the performance of the politically-affiliated business group. It 
may offer some insights into whether the government privatization plans had any positive 
impact on the performance of the politically-affiliated business group. Finally, the first 
sub-period from 1985 to 1989 marked the start of the recession and recovery period43 in 
Malaysia. This may offer some insights into whether the politically-affiliated business 
group had similar financial crises like firms of the independent group. The choice of 
1994 as the end of the second sub-period is due to data limitations. 
43 
The recession period was from 1984 to 1986, and the period of recovery was from 1987 to 1988. 
46 
Data Source 
The following files are retrieved from the PACAP Databases-Malaysia compiled 
by the Sandra-Ann Morsilli Pacific-Basin Capital Markets Research Center (PACAP) at 
the University of Rhode Island: 
1) Financial Statements file for Industrial Companies to get annual accounting data. 
2) Monthly Stock Price and Returns file to get monthly stock return data. 
3) Monthly Market Index file to get monthly market return data. 
4) Key Economic Statistics file to get the 12-month Treasury Bill rates. 
Data are also checked against the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Annual 
Handbook and the annual reports of various companies. 
Dependent Variables 
Profitability Measures 
I use three alternative measures of profitability performance: return on equity 
(ROE), return on assets (ROA), and market-adjusted returns. The first two measures, 
ROE and ROA are a replication of the measurement used in Nakatani ( 1984 ), while the 
market-adjusted return measure is consistent with Kang's and Shivdasani's (1995) 
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measure of performance. ROA and ROE are two measures of accounting profit while 
market-adjusted return is a measure of economic profit. The main difference between the 
accounting profit and economic profit is that the former does not focus on cash flows 
when they occur, whereas the latter does. The economic definition of profit correctly 
deducts the entire expenditure for investment in plant and equipment at the time the cash 
outflow occurs. 
The profitability measures are as follows: 
1) Return on assets = net income after taxes/ total assets 
2) Return on equity = net income after taxes/ shareholder' s equity 
3) Market adjusted returns (R *j ) = Rj - Rut 
where, 
R *j = market-adjusted annual return for stock j; 
Rj = annual stock return for stock j; 
Rut = market return. 
Investment Decision Measures 
The first investment decision measure is a replication of Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharf stein ( 1991 ). It is given by: 
INVI = I/ K 
where I = changes in net fixed assets between period t and period t-1 
K = total fixed assets in period t-1 
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Since the objective of this study is to examine the investment decisions of the 
political firms, that is, how these firms decide on what future investments they should 
undertake, the above ratio will indicate that the higher the ratio, the higher be the level of 
investment by the firm. However, this reasoning may not be applicable to the political 
firms, since most of their future investment projects will be directly or indirectly related 
to government expenditure plan. 
The second investment measure is given by: 
INV2 = net fixed asset I book value of total asset 
It measures the capital intensity of the firm. The higher the ratio, the higher will 
be the use of capital. 
The difference between the two measures is that the first is a flow measure and 
the second is a stock measure. 
Financing Decision Measure 
The financing decision measures are given as follows: 
FINI =(total liabilities - current liabilities)/ (total liabilities - current liabilities + 
book value of equity) 
FIN2 =interest-bearing loans I (interest-bearing loans+ market value of equity) 
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The first measure examines the effect of long term liabilities and book value of 
equity on the financing decision, while the second measure examines the debt to equity 
ratio as the financing decision. 
Explanatory Variables 
Liquidity (LIQ) 
Following Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1988), this study uses income after 
tax plus (accounting) depreciation less dividend payments as a liquidity measure. 
Risk Measures 
This study examines two types of risk, the operating risk and the systematic 
risk. The operating risk has two measures, one is the coefficient of variation of annual 
percentage change in net operating income, an indicator of earning variability44 (CVl), 
and the other is coefficient of variation of annual percentage change in sales, an indicator 
of sales variability (CV2). Coefficient of variation is standard deviation of mean divided 
by mean. It measures the percentage of standard deviation relative to the mean annual 
changes. This is an alternative indicator for volatility. The two measures, CVl and CV2 
represent the operating risk of the firm, which is also known as unsystematic risk. 
The third measure of risk is beta which represents the systematic risk. The 
formula for beta is given by the covariance between returns on a the risky asset and 
market portfolio, divided by the variance of the market portfolio. It is a comprehensive 
44 
This is consistent with Tilman and Wessels ( 1988). 
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measure which captures the systematic risk of the firm's common stock relative to the 
market portfolio. It consists of business, operating and financial ri sk of the firms. 
Firm Size 
The natural logarithm of market equity is the indicator of size. 
Growth 
There are two growth indicators, the annualized compound growth rate in total 
assets, which is consistent with Titman and Wessels (1988), and Chang and Rhee (1990), 
and Tobin's q. This study uses proxy for q following Kang and Stulz (1995) which is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities plus market value of equity to total liabilities plus 
book value of equity. 
Industry Classification (IC) 
This study classifies firms into three industry classifications, based on the sector 
groupings from the New Straits Times and KLSE Industrial groupings. Group 1 consists 
of three industries, i.e., consumer products, trading services and hotels; Group 2 consists 
of three industries, i.e., industrial products, construction and properties; Group 3 
consists of two industries, i.e., plantation and mining. Dl is equal to l if group equals to 
l; and zero otherwise. D2 is equal to l if group equals to 3 and zero otherwise. The 
control variable is group 2. 
Group Dummy 
G is equal to 1 for politically-affiliated group and zero otherwise. 
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Research Methodology 
To test the preferential treatment hypothesis, I use cross-sectional ordinary least 
squares regression approach and regress the profitability performance measures, the 
investment decisions measures and financing behavior measures against five explanatory 
variables, i.e., liquidity, risk, size, growth and industry dummy. 
The whole period regression analyses use ten-year average of data of each firm. 
The sub-period regression analyses use five-year average of data of each firm. The 
regression analyses are first conducted for the whole period and the two sub-periods for 
the politically-affiliated business group and the two selections of independent group. 
Only dummy variables for industry classifications will be included. D 1 represents 
industrial group 1, while D2 represents industrial group 3. 
Next, the regression analyses will be conducted for the whole period and for the 
two sub-periods for the entire samples. A dummy variable, G, will be included where G 
is equal to 1 to represent the politically-affiliated business group and 0 otherwise. 
Non-parametric analyses are conducted to compare the average often-year 
statistics and five-year statistics (for two sub-periods) between politically-affiliated group 
and the two independent groups. Additionally, the average of five-year average statistics 
for the politically-affiliated business groups are compared between the two sub-periods. 
52 
The Models 
The Endogenous Variables 
i) Profitability Measures : ROA, ROE, R *j 
ii) Investment Decision Measures: INVI, INV2 
where 
INVI = changes in net fixed investments I total fixed investments 
INV2 = net fixed asset I book value of total asset; 
iii) Financing Decision Measures: FINI and FIN2 
FINI = (total liabilities - current liabilities) I (total liabilities - current liabilities 
+book value of equity) 
FIN2 =(interest-bearing loans) I (interest-bearing loans+ market value of 
equity) 
The Exogenous Variables 
where 
The exogenous or independent variables are LIQ, CVJ , CV2, p, SIZE, 
GRW, Q, IC,G 
LIQ = income after tax plus accounting depreciation less 
dividend payments; 
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CVl The coefficient of variation of annual changes in net 
operating income; 
CV2 The coefficient of variation of annual changes in net 
sales; 
P = beta; 
SIZE = log (market equity); 
GR W = annual compound growth rate in total assets; 
Q =(total liabilities+ market value of equity)/( total 
liabilities + book value of equity); 
IC = D 1 = 1 if industry is 1; and zero otherwise; 
D2 = 1 if industry is 3; and zero otherwise. 
DUMMY G = I for politically-affiliated business group and 0 
otherwise .. 
The Ordinary Least-Squares Models 
The ordinary least-squares and the expected signs of coefficients of the models 
which include all independent variables are as follows: 
ii) lNVl, INV2 = Yo+ y1LIQ - Y2GRW ± y3 RISK ± Y4 Dl ± Ys 02 ± Y6G 
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iii) FINI , FIN2 Ao+ A. 1LIQ - A.2RISK + A3SIZE - A4GRW ± As DI + A.6 D2 ± 
A.1G 
Summary 
This chapter developed the research and methodology used in this study. It 
discussed the source and composition of data. It explained the selection of politically-
affiliated business group, the independent group matched according to industrial 
grouping and size, and the independent group with less than 20 percent of voting stocks 
owned by an individual or group of stockholders. It also explained the selection of 
industrial grouping and the period of study. Additionally, this chapter defined and 
explained the variable measurements, and presented the regression models used in the 
study. 
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CHAPTERV 
RESULTS 
Sample Description 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics on market capitalization from 1985 
through 1994 inclusive. Market capitalization is given by the year-end price multiplied by 
the number of shares, and it is in billions of Malaysian ringgit. 
The percentage of market capitalization to total capitalization for the politically-
affiliated group increased from 6 percent in 1985 (RM. 3.5 billion) to 21 percent in 1994 
(RM. 103.53 billion). The percentage for the independent group was 5.38 percent in 
1985 (RM. 3.37 billion) and it dropped to its lowest point of 4.52 percent in 1989, but 
then increased to 6.10 percent in 1994 (RM. 30.07 billion). The market capitalization 
for politically-affiliated firms not only increased over the ten-year period but the 
percentage to total market reached double digits from 1990 onwards. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Market Capitalization 
(in RM. billion) 
Percentage 
to total 
inarlcet 
1985 58.3 3.50 6.00 3.37 5.78 
1986 64.5 3.15 4.88 3.42 5.30 
1987 73 .9 3.55 4.80 4.04 5.47 
1988 98.7 5.33 5.40 7.09 7.18 
1989 156. l 10.48 6.71 7.06 4.52 
1990 131.7 13 .55 10.29 6.87 5.22 
1991 161.3 25 .60 15 .87 7.99 4.95 
1992 245 .8 38.20 15 .54 12.12 4.93 
1993 328.5 59.23 18.55 20.70 6.30 
1994 493 .0 101.31 20.55 30.07 6.10 
Source: Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Annual Companies Handbook 
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Table 2A presents the summary statistics of profitability performance measures 
for firms in the politically-affiliated group, matching independent group, and fully 
independent group during the whole sample period, and also during the two separate 
sub-periods. There is little difference in the mean and median values of return on 
asset (ROA) between the politically-affiliated business group and the two independent 
groups. In contrast, the return on equity (ROE) is significantly higher for the fully 
independent group as compared to the politically-affiliated business group during the 
whole sample period. The summary statistic for the whole period suggests that even 
though the accounting definition of profit is much higher for the fully independent group 
than the politically-affiliated group, there is no significant difference in the economic 
definition of profit between the two groups. Thus, it could mean that the investors are 
indifferent with respect to their economic expectations of the two groups. 
The first investment measure I calculated for the entire sample period and the 
two sub-periods suggests that there is no significant difference between the politically-
affiliated business group and the two independent groups. Additionally, the results for 
the first financing decisions measured for the whole sample period, the first sub-period 
and the second sub-period suggest that the politically-affiliated business group has a 
significantly higher first financing measure than do the independent groups in the sample, 
at 1 percent significance level, but the second financing measure shows little or no 
significant difference between the three groups in the sample. 
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Table 2A 
Sununary Statistics 
The first line reports the mean values while the second line reports the median values. Standard deviation of 
mean is reported in parentheses. The differences in mean is tested using Wilcoxon 2-sample Test. The t-statistic 
ta statistics refers to mean differences between politically-affiliated group and matching independent group. 
Tue t-statistic lb refers to mean differences between politically-affiliated firms and fully independent group. 
Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Var. a Pol.-affiliated Matching Ind. ta Fully Ind. ~ 
PROFIT ABILITY PERFORMANCE 
Whole Period: 1985-1994 
ROA 0.022(0.051) 0.009(0.291) 0.026(0.162) 
0.034 0.046 1.526 0.032 1.675 
ROE 0.021(0.108) -0.117(1.814) 0.044(0.202) 
0.023 0.071 1.397 0.053 6.185** 
R* 0.058(0.069) 0.057(0.559) 0.062(0.594) 
0.043 -0.121 1.354 0.047 0.177 
First Sub-period: 1985-1989 
ROA 0.045(0.123) 0.054(0.079) 0.033(0.239) 
0.045 0.054 1.002 0.047 0.072 
ROE 0.054(0.236) 0.071 (0.356) 0.069(0.112) 
0.125 0.082 0.601 0.071 5.046* 
R* -0.042(0.395) -0.095(0.534) 0.155(0.068) 
-0.069 -0.113 3.475* 0.121 4.056* 
Second Sub-period: 1990-1994 
ROA 0.045(0.123) (l 054(0 079) 0.033(0.239) 
0.045 0.054 1002 0.047 0.072 
ROE 0.054(0.236) 0.071 (0 .356) 0.069(0. 112) 
0.125 0.082 0.601 0.07 1 5.046* 
R* -0.042(0.395) -0.095(0.534) 0. 155(0.068) 
-0.069 -0.113 3.475* 0.12 1 4.056* 
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FINANCING MEASURES 
Whole Period : 1985-1994 
FINI 0.478(0.186) 0.404(0.173) 0.396(0.1 76) 
0.473 0.403 5. 195** 0.302 6.341 ** 
FIN2 0.833(0.362) 0.859(0.344) 0.852(0.346) 
0.995 0.994 0.152 0.999 1.459 
First Sub-Period: 1985-1989 
FINI 0.474(0.167) 0.088(0.003) 0.069(0.007) 
0.449 0.082 17.593** 0.065 15.903** 
FIN2 0. 778(0.407) 0.868(0.334) 0.823(0.372) 
0.998 0.999 1.420 0.998 0.086 
Second Sub-Period: 1990-1994 
FINI 0.479(0.198) 0.414(0.162) 0.411(0.178) 
0.482 0.4 11 5.963** 0.409 4.503** 
FIN2 0.866(0.328) 0.854(0.351) 0.869(0.329) 
0.999 0.999 0.812 0.999 1.097 
INVESTMENT MEASURES 
Whole Period : 1985-1994 
INV! 2.135(3.93 1) 2.105(2.145) 2.159(3.783) 
0.021 0.03 1 0.936 0.017 0.902 
INV2 0.392(0.225) 0.096(0.231) 0.299(0.234) 
0.363 0.042 7.386** 0.258 5.827** 
First Sub-Period: 1985-1989 
INV! 2.896( 1.408) 3. 184(2.103) 3.369(2.050) 
0.023 0.078 1.192 0.023 0.273 
INV2 0.356(0.264) 0.389(0.220) 0.412(0.229) 
0.361 0.389 1.859 0.390 1.84 
Second Sub-Period: 1990-1994 
INV! 1.788(5.633) 1.674(2. 945) 1.159( 1.528) 
0.0 19 0.023 0. 113 0.001 0.096 
INV2 0.412 (0 .229) 0.265(0.207) 0.381 (0.222) 
0.390 0.233 8.262' 0.347 5.717** 
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Table 2B presents the summary statistics of profitability performance, financing 
measures and investment measures for the politically-affiliated group in the two sub-
periods. The result shows that even though ROA and ROE are lower in the second sub-
period compared to the first sub-period for the politically-affiliated group, the market-
adjusted return, the financing measure and the investment measure are significantly 
higher during the second sub-period. 
Table 2C provides the summary statistics of the independent variables for the 
whole sample period and the two sub-periods. The liquidity results show that the 
politically-affiliated group generally has lower liquidity compared to the independent 
groups. In contrast, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharf stein ( 1991) found that keiretsu firms are 
more liquid than independent firms. Yoshihara's (1988) claim that the politically-
affiliated business group has easy access to bank loans cannot be empirically supported in 
this study. Thus, it appears from the table that firms in the politically-affiliated business 
group not only did not enjoy higher liquidity than other independent groups in the 
sample, but they are also more liquidity constrained than fully independent group. From 
the financing decision measure results, it may be hypothesized that the politically-
affiliated business group prefers to have long term obligations rather than short term 
loans, which, in a way, may mitigate the agency costs of free cash flow45 • 
45Jensen's (1986) agency cost of free cash flow assumed that managers act in their own interest to the 
detriment of shareholders ' interests. He defined free cash flow as "cash flow in excess of that required to 
fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. '. 
Thus debt obligations may mitigate the agency cost of free cash flow since debt obligations forced 
managers to put aside cash and not waste it on other inefficiencies. 
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However, comparative analysis of the two sub-periods for the politically-
affiliated business group suggests that the group enjoyed significantly higher liquidity 
during the second sub-period than the first sub-period. Since the profitability 
performance measure indicates that the politically-affiliated group obtained higher profits 
in the second sub-period, based on pecking order theory, the liquidity should also be 
higher in the second sub-period for the politically-affiliated group. 
Nevertheless, a comparative analysis of the summary statistics between the 
politically-affiliated group and independent groups may not provide any concrete results, 
since we must take into consideration the effect of other independent variables on a 
firm's profitability performance, investment decisions and financing decisions. Thus, in 
order to examine these three issues, we must control for each of the independent 
variables. The following regression analyses will examine the differences in profitability 
performance, financing behavior and investment decision between the politically-
affiliated group and the two independent groups. Additionally, a dummy variable used to 
represent the politically-affiliated group in a full sample regression analysis. The analysis 
will be conducted to examine the effect of political-affiliation on profitability 
performance, financing and investment decisions. 
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Table 2B 
Summary Statistics for Politically-Affiliated Group in Two Sub Periods 
This table presents mean and median values used in this study. The sample consists of 350 finn-year 
observations each for politically-affiliated business group in two sub periods, 1985-89 and 1990-1994. 
The first line reports the mean values while the second line reports the median values. Standard 
deviation of mean is reported in parentheses. lbe differences in mean is tested using Wilcoxon 2-sample 
Test. The t-statistics tests the mean differences between the two sub-periods. Statistical significance at 
the 1and5 percent levels are denoted by** and* respectively. 
Var. First sub-period (1985-1989) Second sub-period ( 1990-1994) 
mean median mean median t-test 
PROFIT ABILITY PERFORMANCE 
ROA 0.045(0.123) 0.045 0.008(0.165) 0.025 6.691 ** 
ROE 0.054(0.236) 0.125 0.029(0.008) 0.052 5.278* 
R* -0.042(0.395) -0.069 0.345(0.056) 0.199 14.123* 
FINANCING MEASURES 
FINI 0.474(0.167) 0.449 0.479(0.198) 0.482 0.351 
FIN2 0.778(0.407) 0.998 0.866(0.328) 0.999 2.454** 
INVESTMENT MEASURES 
INVI 2.896(1.408) 0.023 1.788(5.633) 0.019 1.914 
INV2 0.356(0.264) 0.361 0.412 (0.229) 0.390 3.080** 
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Table 2C 
Summary Statistics for Independent Variables 
The first line reports the mean values while the second line reports the median values. Standard deviation of 
mean is reported in parentheses. The differences in mean is tested using Wilcoxon 2-sample Test. The t-statistic 
ta statistics refers to mean differences between politically-affiliated group and matching independent group. 
Tue t-statistic ti, refers to mean differences between politically-affiliated firms and fully independent group. 
Statistical significance at the l and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and *respectively. 
Var. a Pol.-affiliated Matching Ind. t a Fully Ind. tb 
Whole Period: 1985-1994 
LIQ 9.259(1 .622) 9.263(1.610) 11.33(1.122) 
9.667 9.417 0 .544 11.376 7.810** 
Size 11.68( 1.342) 11.57(1.272) 8.547(1.2) 
11.602 11 .634 0.969 8.722 8.719** 
GRW 0.071(0.841) 0 .009(0.959) -0 .010(0.829) 
0.058 0 .063 0 .194 0.052 0.146 
Q 0.645(0.186) 0.519(0.186) 0.469(0.20 l) 
0.654 0 .535 2.046* 0.472 3.124** 
CVl 0.781(0.328) 1.002(0.414) 0.816 (0 .462) 
0.613 0 .988 4.545** 0 .698 7.315** 
CV2 0.339(0.416) 0.447(0.482) 0.288(0.327) 
0.376 0.416 5.461** 0.204 9.57** 
Beta 0.986(0.451) 1.068(0.354) 1.057(0.344) 
1.009 1.062 0.361 1.068 0.470 
First Sub-period: 1985-1989 
LIQ 8.541(1 .254) 8. 794( 1.452) 10.92(1.144) 
8.449 8.860 1.784 10.857 3.093** 
Size 10.979( 1.157) 10.41(1.175) 10.221 ( 1.1 49) 
10.942 10.33 0.603 10.432 1.704 
GRW 
-0.007(0.89 1) 0 .038( 1.0 19) -0 .111 (0.954) 
0.045 0.089 3.987* 0 .063 0.035 
Q 0.556(0.15 I ) 0.547(0 .305) 0.449(0.192) 
0.594 0.489 0.669 0.431 23 .646** 
CVl 0 547(0 .304) 0 .636(0.351 ) 0.673(0. 305) 
0.489 0 .594 4.482* 0 .588 3.569 
CV2 0.347(0.456) 0.4 13(0 33 1) 0 .311 (0 23 2) 
0. 311 0 .299 2.1 63 0 .235 4.108** 
Beta 1.009 (0 .438) 1.0 17 (0354) 1.065(0 342) 
1.068 1.057 0.0 14 1.009 0.922 
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Second Sub-~riod : 1990- 1994 
LIQ 9.701( 1.667) 9.576(1.62 1) 11.57(1.039) 
9.855 9.864 0.367 11.62 5.669** 
Size 12.11 (1.267) 12.18(1.244) 8.763(1.187) 
12.03 12.07 0.461 8.901 5.867** 
GRW 0.094(0. 924) 0.015(0.044) -0.071 (0.822) 
0.065 0.871 0.677 0.026 1.443 
Q 0.539(0.204) 0.513(0.181) 0.481(0.206) 
0.56 1 0.532 1.823 0.491 3.633** 
CV! 0.542(0.403) 0.8 1(0.375) 0.642(0.437) 
0.346 0.693 7.913** 0.585 8.6 19** 
CV2 0.33 1(0.468) 0.391(0.305) 0.299(0.261) 
0.376 0.299 2.280* 0.232 5.92** 
Beta 0.972(0.459) 1.0 14(0.3 54) 1.052(0.346) 
0.928 1.062 0.699 1.009 1.374 
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Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
Profitability Performance Measures 
Table 3 presents the cross-sectional regression analysis results on the profitability 
performance measure for the politically-affiliated business group, matching independent 
group, and fully independent group for the whole sample period from 1985 to 1994, and 
also for the two sub-periods. In particular, this study is interested in the differences in the 
determinants of profitability performance, investment behavior and financing behavior 
between the politically-affiliated group and the two independent groups in the sample. 
The three profitability performance models produce different results. For the 
politically-affiliated group, only the explanatory variables for the market-adjusted return 
model have the expected signs. The coefficient of the size variable is negative and 
significant; the coefficient for the risk measure is positive and significant; and the 
coefficient for the liquidity variable is positive and significant. This is consistent with 
previous studies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) presented their argument that size should 
be negatively related to profitability, since the larger the firm size, the higher the agency 
cost, thus the lower the profitability expected. While both the risk-premium hypothesis 
and the pecking order theory suggest a positive relation between risk and profitability. 
Ironically, when ROA is used as the dependent variable, all the explanatory 
appear with signs opposite of what would be expected and are significant. For the ROE 
model, only the liquidity variable appears with the correct positive sign and is significant. 
Thus, even though the three measures are indicators of profitability performance, there 
could be different interpretations of determinants of accounting profit and economic 
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profit. The results for the ROA model are that the coefficient for size is positive and 
significant, while the coefficients for risk and liquidity are negative and significant. The 
inference is that asset-utilization is more efficient by the larger firms than the smaller 
firms, since the larger the firm, the higher the return generated from asset. The results 
further suggest that firms with risky operations tend to have a smaller return on assets. 
The negative relation between liquidity and ROA may indicate the presence of the 
agency cost of free cash flow within the politically-affiliated group. According to 
Jensen's (1986) agency cost of free cash flow theory, managers act in their own interest 
to the detriment of shareholders' interests. They would utilize the free cash flow, defined 
as "cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present 
values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital'', to indulge in wasteful activities, 
such as taking on projects with negative net present value, with the sole purpose of 
increasing their pecuniary benefits. Nevertheless, since the purpose of this study is not to 
test the agency cost of free cash flow, the discussion on the agency cost of free cash flow 
will be limited to the negative relation between liquidity and return on asset. 
Results for the fully independent group show that only the market-adjusted return 
model provides a similar result as the politically-affiliated group; the explanatory 
variables appear with the expected signs and they are all significant. While only two 
explanatory variables (i .e., size and risk) in the market-adjusted return model for the 
matching independent group appear with the correct signs (i.e. , negative and positive 
respectively) and are significant. 
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The whole sample period analysis indicates that after controlling for growth, size, 
risk and liquidity, the industry dummy Dl for all three groups in the sample has a 
negative and significant coefficient when ROA is used as a profitability performance 
measure, thus indicating a significantly lower performance when firms are in the 
industrial grouping46 1. However, for firms in industrial grouping 3, the coefficient is 
negative and significant only for the matching and fully independent groups, while the 
coefficient for the politically-affiliated group is also negative but insignificant. 
When ROE is used as the profitability performance measure, the coefficient for 
the dummy D2 is negative and significant for the fully independent group but positive 
and significant for the politically-affiliated group, indicating firms in the politically-
affiliated group in the plantation and mining sectors are able to earn significantly higher 
returns on their equity, i.e., about 7 percent more, than other sectors in the same group. 
While in the fully independent group, firms in the same sector groupings obtained 13 .5 
percent less returns on their equity than firms in other sectors in the fully independent 
group. 
When market-adjusted return is used as the profitability performance measure, 
the coefficients of the two dummy variables become negative and significant for the 
politically-affiliated business but not for the other independent groups. For the 
politically-affiliated group, firms in the industrial products, construction and properties 
sectors (i .e., Group 2) earn significantly higher returns than firms in the other sectors. 
46 Group l consists of three industries, i.e., consumer products, trading services and hotels; Group 2 
consists of three industries, i.e., industrial products, construction and properties; Group 3 consists of two 
industries, i.e., plantation and mining. The dummy variables are represented by 01and02, where 01 is 
1 if group is equal to I and zero otherwise; and 02 is 1 if group is equal to 3 and zero othenvise. 
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This result can be expected since the two largest firms in the sample, i.e., Renong and 
United Engineers, are in the construction sectors. These firms are able to earn higher 
market-adjusted returns because they are on the frontier of most government 
privatization projects. The sub-period analyses also provide similar results. However, the 
result for the independent groups shows just the opposite. Independent firms in the two 
independent groups earn significantly higher returns only if they are in the consumer 
products, trading services, hotels, plantation and mining sectors. 
The results on the profitability performance provide similar evidence. First, there 
seems to be no difference in behavior between politically-affiliated group and fully 
independent group under the market-adjusted return model. The hypothesis that the 
politically-affiliated group exhibits different profitability performance cannot be 
supported. The signs of the determinants of the model are as expected and they are all 
significant. 
However, under the market-adjusted return model, the matching independent 
group does not seem to exhibit similar behavior to the politically-affiliated group. 
Growth affects profitability in a positive and significant way, while liquidity affects 
profitability in a negative and significant way. Thus, the economic assertion is that, when 
a firm has growth prospects, the stock market reacts positively, but the higher liquidity 
position of a firm implies a lower market-adjusted return. Unlike the politically-affiliated 
group, evidence of agency cost of free cash flow in the matching independent group is 
reflected in the economic definition of profit rather than in the accounting definition of 
profit. 
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Table 3 
Profitabilitv Performance Regression Results for the Whole Sample Period 1985-1994 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for profitability performance measure for the period 1985-1994 based on five-year average of ROA, ROE 
and R *. The regression model is defined by the three performance measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. 
Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 
and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Ind. var Politically-affiliated Matching Independent Fully Independent 
--a 
ROA ROE R* ROA ROE R* ROA ROE R* 
Intercept -0.139 -0.427 -1.243 0.040 -0.991 0.910 -0.096 -0.288 1.079 
(-3.254)** (6.062)•• (-5.531)•• (0.975) (-4.484)** (4.64)** (-4.996)** (-3.816)** (4.88)** 
-..J 
0 SIZE 0.032 0.013 -0.082 -0.009 0.012 -0.068 -0.002 0.036 -0.198 
(5 .332)** (l.230) (-4.577)** (-1.063) (0.326) (-2.343)* (-0.572) (1.985)* (-5.965)** 
RISK -0.062 -0.070 0.185 -0.'.211 -0.082 0.19'.2 -0.137 -0. 135 0.151 
(-8. 503)** (-5.799)** (5.495)** (-7.595)** (-'.2.37)* (7.979)** (-16.951)** (-'.2.802)** (4.272)** 
LIQ -0.015 0.035 0.009 0.031 0.106 -0.186 0.0416 0.038 0.118 
(-2.636)** (3.664)** (0.704) (3 .765)•• (3.343)*• (-7.234)** (9.8'.29)** (2.230)* (3.989)** 
DI -0.029 0.011 -0.06'.2 -0.063 0.115 0.128 -0.023 -0.090 0.066 
(-4.045)** (0.936) (-2.336)* (-4.576)** (2.304)* (4.885)** (-6.773)** (-6.140)** (2.64)** 
02 -0.0 13 0.0740 -0.058 -0.079 0.079 0.286 -0.071 -0.135 0.264 
(-1.532) (5.154)** (-1.62'.2) (-4.038)** (1.460) (5 .75)** (-14.216)** (-5 .948)** (6.53)** 
-Adjusted R 0.50 0.58 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.4'.2 0.61 0.63 0.69 
F-statistic 54.97•• 58.01 ** 55.47•• 61.49*• 66.08•• 44.58 .. 73.88** 77.32•• 87.79** 
Sampl.: size 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
s"c Appendix I for defmition of variables 
Table 3 (continue) 
Profitability Performance Regression Results for the First Sub Period 1985 -1989 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for profitability performance measure for the period 1985-1989 based on five-year average of ROA, ROE 
and R *. The regression model is defined by the three performance measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. 
Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White ( 1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 
and 5 percent levels arc denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Ind. var Politically-affiliated Matching Independent Fully Independent 
ROA ROE R* ROA ROE R* ROA ROE R* 
Intercept -0.357 -0.780 -0.097 -0.002 -0.389 -0.289 -0.121 -0.869 -0.728 
(-8.416)** (-7.559)** (-0 .608) (-0.057) (-4.337)** (-3.479)** (-2.85)** (-6.352)** (-7.089)** 
SIZE 0.024 0.061 -0.104 -0.042 -0.110 -0.024 -0.009 0.032 0.0438 
-..J (3.465)** (3 .051)** (-4.803)** (-7.22)** (-4.717)** (-2.465)* (-1.713) (2.389)* (3.822)** 
RISI..: 0.048 0. 139 0.100 0.031 0.078 0.047 0.008 0.108 0.068 
(6.786)** (6. 18)** (4.019)** (5.35)** (3.519)** (3.819)** ( 12.52)** (5 .900)** (2.603)** 
LIQ 0.005 -0.00 1 -0.060 0.064 0.187 -0.007 0.061 0.103 -0.029 
(1.031) (-0.046) (-3 .105)** (12.053)** (6.29)** (-0.714) (8 .058)** (3.951)** (-2 .719)* * 
DI 0.016 0.154 -0.098 0.003 0.013 -0.041 -0.042 -0.162 -0.006 
(2.105)* (4.888)** (-4.056)** (0.598) (0.647) (-1.65) (-4.645)** (-7.036)** (-0.496) 
02 0.062 0.221 -0.063 0.062 0.197 -0.162 -0.047 -0.142 0.039 
(10.923 )** (5.473)** (-2.269)* (8.009)** (6.06)** (-6.426)** (-6.6 16)** (-5.447)** (2.64)** 
-Adjusted R 0.45 0.43 0.38 0.54 0.56 0.62 0.58 0.60 0.66 
F-stati;.tic 41.69** 48.99** 27.77** 86.02** 94.41 ** 98.11 ** 83.45** 95 .94** 118.68** 
Sample size 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Table 3 (continue) 
Profitability Perfonnance Regression Results for the Second Sub Period 1990 - 1994 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for profitability performance measure for the period 1990-1994 based on five-year average of ROA, ROE 
and R *. The regression model is defined by the three performance measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. 
Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980) . Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 
1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Ind. Var Politically-affiliated Matching Independent Fully Independent 
ROA ROE R* ROA ROE R* ROA ROE R* 
Intercept -0.044 -1.002 -0.844 -0.002 -0.389 -0.289 -0.142 -1.221 2.533 
(-0.848) (-9.93)** (-1.616) (-0.057) (-4.337)** (-3.479)** (-4.327)** (-3.928)** (7.989)** 
---l 
tv SIZE -0.003 0.073 -0.091 -0.042 -0.11 0.024 0.015 0.203 -0.105 
(-0.402) (7.488)** (-2.12 1)* (-7.229)** (-4.717)** (2.465)* (3.317)** (4.632)** (-2.523)** 
RISK 0.0608 0.115 0.269 0.031 0.078 0.047 0.036 0.014 0.204 
(8.387)** (8.364)** (5.259)** (5.349)** (3.519)** (3.819)** (9.056)** (0.712) (3.446)** 
LIQ 0.004 0.012 0.018 0.064 0.180 -0.007 0.017 -0.083 -0.115 
(0.775) (1.266) (0.450) (12.053)** (6.29)** (-0.714) (5.984)** (-3 .915)** (-1.795) 
DI -0.042 -0.021 -0.010 0.003 0.014 -0.041 -0.004 -0.029 -0.01 
(-5.164)** (-2.148)* (-0.130) (0.599) (0.647) (-1.651) (-1.218) (-1.952)* (-0.285) 
02 -0.011 0.055 -0.188 0.062 0.197 -0.162 -0.038 -0.128 0.495 
(-1.068) (2 .81 9)** (-1.666) (8.009)** (6.063)** (-6.426)** (-8.661)** (-5.646)** (9.251)** 
Adjusted R - 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.49 
F-stati;tic 54.24** 54.33** 34.02** 86.02** 69.61** 76.12•• 68.38** 76.96** 60.36** 
Sample si z.e 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Financing Behavior Measures 
Table 4 presents the regression results for the financing behavior models for the 
whole sample period, the first sub-period and the second sub-period. Results for the 
whole sample period indicated that the politically-affiliated group exhibits different 
financing behavior than do the two independent groups. 
When the first financing decision measure is used (i.e., FINI), the size coefficient 
has the expected sign (positive) and it is significant for all groups in the sample. 
This is consistent with the study done by Chang and Rhee ( 1990) that well-established 
firms have easy access to the capital markets compared to smaller and less-established 
firms. When the second decision measure is used, the size coefficient is again positive 
and significant for the two independent groups but not for the politically-affiliated group. 
The politically-affiliated group has a negative and significant coefficient for the size 
variable, which lends support to the previous study by Titman and Wessels ( 1988) that 
small firms are more leveraged and prefer to use short term loans rather than issueing 
long term debt. 
The coefficient for growth variable is positive and significant for the politically-
affiliated group but negative and significant for the fully independent group. The result 
for the politically-affiliated group is consistent with the pecking order theory that rapid 
growth implies a higher debt capacity and an ability to pay interests, and lenders may 
charge a lower cost to the firm with sound future prospects. In contrast, results for 
independent groups are consistent with the hypothesis of the study which is based on the 
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theory of agency cost presented in previous studies [Titman and Wessels (1988); Jensen 
and Meckling (1976); Myer (1977); and Stulz (1990)]. 
Result for the risk measure shows a positive and significant relation between risk 
and financing for the politically-affiliated group but not for the independent group. Thus 
the hypothesis that high operating risk firms prefers to use more leverage can only be 
supported for the politically-affiliated group. The inference is that, banks may be 
reluctant to extend loans to firms in the independent groups with high operating risk. 
However, the same inference may not hold true for the politically-affiliated group, since 
firms in that group are known to help out one another in times of financial distress or 
impending financial distress. The positive relation between risk and financing may 
suggest that the assistance could be in the form of increased financing. 
The results for the liquidity measure are mixed. When the first financing measure 
is used, the results support the hypothesis of a negative relation between liquidity and 
financing for the politically-affiliated and matching independent group. However, the 
liquidity measure coefficient is positive and significant for politically-affiliated group and 
fully independent group when percentage of interest-bearing loans is used as an 
alternative financing measure. The inference is that when liquidity is high, interest-
bearing loans, including short term loans, are more preferred than long-term loans to 
finance investments. This may be because short term obligations can easily be met with 
internal fund . 
When the second financing measure is used (i.e., FIN2), the dummy variable for 
industrial group 3 for the whole sample period is similar for all three groups in the 
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sample; the coefficient for dummy variable D2 is negative and significant which indicates 
that firms in the plantation and mining sectors use significantly less interest-bearing loans 
than firms in other sectors. The results are consistent throughout the two sub periods, 
but not statistically significant for the politically-affiliated group in the first sub period 
and not statistically significant for the fully independent group in the second sub period. 
In contrast, when the first financing measure is used, the coefficient for D2 is positive for 
all three groups in the sample, but not statistically significant for the matching 
independent group. The inference is that firms in the plantation and mining sector prefer 
to use long-term debt rather than short-term loan. 
Results for the whole sample period show that the dummy variable coefficients 
(D 1) are not significant. But results for the matching independent group in the first sub-
period for the first and second financing measures, are negative and significant, and 
positive and significant, respectively, indicating firms in the D 1 industrial grouping prefer 
to use more interest-bearing loans but less long term liabilities than firms in other sectors. 
This indicates that during the first sub period, only firms in the different industrial 
groupings in the matching independent group has significantly different financing 
behavior. While the politically-affiliated group shows no significant differences in 
financing behavior between the industrial groups. Generally, the results for financing 
decisions measure support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group exhibits 
different financing behavior than the independent group. 
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Table 4 
Financing Behavior Regression Results for the Whole Sample Period (1985 - 1994) 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for financing behavior measure for fmns in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully 
independent group, for the period 1 985-1 994 based on ten-year average of FINI, and FIN2. The regression model is defined by the two financing behavior measures used. GRW 
is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for 
heteroskedasticity following White ( 1980). Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by •• and • 
respectively. 
Ind. Var Politically-affiliated Matching Independent Fully Independent 
FINI FIN2 FINI FIN2 FINI FIN2 
Intercept -0 .136 (-3 . 935)** 1.063 (8.279)** 0.095 ( 1.565) -0.197 (-1.262) 0.037 (l.004) -0.648 (-3.925)** 
GRW 0.092 (7 .759)** 0.044 (0.892) -0.086 (-3.285)** -0.244 (-3.757)** 0.007 (0 .369) -0.329 (4.351)** 
SIZE 0.030 (5.404 )** -0.118 (-10.808)** 0.019 (2.504 )* 0.11 (4.957)** 0.002 (0.279) 0.048 (2 .269)* 
RlSK 0.006 (0.877) 0.046 (2.878)** -0.026 (-3 .511)** -0.112 (-2.547)** -0 .041 (-8.831 )** -0.089 (-3 .715)** 
LIQ -0 .165 (-3.518)** 0.131 (9.794)** -0.029 (-5 .181)** -0.022 (-0. 927) 0.001 (0.176) 0.063 (3.281 )** 
DI 0.005 ( l.003) 0.012 (0.679) -0.002 (-0.183) 0.031 (l.308) -0.007 (-1.363) 0.039 ( 1. 776) 
D2 0.025 (3.465)** -0 .168 (-5 .669)** 0.023 (l.811) -0.316 (-5 .544)** 0.026 (4 .055)** -0.144 (4.132)** 
Adjusted Ri 0. 87 0.58 0.72 0.55 0.71 0.53 
F-Statistic 382 .7** 83 .23** 97.32** 47.11 ** 93.41 ** 43.02** 
Sample size 35 35 35 35 35 35 
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Table 4 (continue) 
Financing Behavior Regression Results for the First Sub-Period (1985 - 1989) 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for financing behavior measure for fums in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully 
independent group, for Ille period 1985-1989 based on five-year average of FINI, and FIN2. The regression model is defined by the two financing behavior measures used. GRW 
is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for 
hcterosko::dasticity follO\\~ng White ( 1980). Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the I and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and • 
respectively. 
Ind. Var Poli ti call y-affiliated Matching Independent Fully Independent 
FINI FIN2 FINI FIN2 FINI FIN2 
Intercept -0.00 I (-0.008) -0.509 (-1.204) 1.020 (7.740)** 0.214 (0.630) 0.039 (0.490) -1.077 (-4.703)* * 
GRW 0.048 (4.437)** -0 .221 (-3.4 13)** 0.170 (6.080)** 0.025 (0.475) 0.029 (2.476)* -0.236 (-4.509)* * 
SIZE -0 .04 1 (-3.783)** -0.289 (-4.205 )** -0.071 (-4.841)** 0.079 (1.513) 0.008 (0.740) 0.064 (3.033)** 
RJSK 0.033 (2.624)** 0.544 (6.361)** 0.067 (2.054)* -0.425 (-4.620)** -0 .067 (-3.279)** 0.004 (0.079) 
LIQ 0.055 (5.457)** 0.441 (5.989)** -0.001 (-0.080) -0.022 (-0.468) -0.009 (-1.008) 0.094 (4.313)** 
DI -0.013 (-1.444) -0.053 (-1.406) -0.141 (-4.321)** 0.129 (3.264 )** -0.048 (-4.604)** 0.042 (1.169) 
D2 0.014 (1.414) -0.033 (-1.406) -0.082 (-2.401)* -0.287 (-3.621 )** -0.006 (-0.497) -0.267 (-4 .068)** 
Adjusted R.l 0.95 0.61 0.71 0.52 0.86 0.76 
f.'-Statistic 236.2 ** 18.9 1 ** 39.92** 18.07** 102.23** 54.40** 
Sampk size 35 35 35 35 35 35 
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Table 4 (continue) 
Financing Behavior Regression Results for the Second Sub-Period (1990 - 1994) 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for financing behavior measure for firms in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully 
independent group, for the period 1990-1994 based on five-year average of FINI, and FIN2. The regression model is defined by the two financing behavior measures used. GRW 
is defmed by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for 
heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * 
respectively. 
fad. Var Politically-affiliated Matching Independent Fully Independent 
FINl FIN2 FINI FIN2 FINI FIN2 
fatercept -0.068 (-1.250) -0.051 (-0.315) -0.160 (-2.006)* -0.567 (-1.859) 0.069 (l.390) -0.890 (-3 .291 )** 
GRW 0.043 (3.834 )** 0.006 (0.163) -0. I 19 (-3 .673)** -0.439 (-5.343)** 0.073 (2.470)* -0.223 (-1.81 9) 
SIZE 0.001 (0.157) 0.048 (2.852)** 0.028 (3.953)** 0.095 (3.747)** 0.009 (1.404) 0.076 (2.415)* 
RISK -0.007 (-0.608) 0.02 I (0.485) -0.046 (-5.364)** -0.056 (-1.155) -0.053 (-9. 708)** -0.106 (-2.900)** 
LIQ 0.011 (2.009)* 0.011 (0.609) -0.018 (-3.548)** 0.023 (1.023) -0.015 (-2.446)* 0.064 (2.382)* 
DI 0.003 (0.402) -0.013 (-0.578) -0.018 (-0. 173) -0.048 (-1.285) 0.009 (1.015) 0.077 (2.773)** 
D2 0.053 (5.664 )** -0.186 (-3.512)** 0.049 (2.716)** -0.212 (-2.368)* 0.031 (2.570)** -0.085 (-1.487) 
Adjusted R 1. 0.93 0.46 0.79 0.42 0.90 0.69 
F-Statistic 247.84** 16.62** 69.58** 14.08** 151.5** 39.68** 
Sample size 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Investment Decisions Behavior 
The results in Table 5 provides one interesting result. In the whole sample 
regression results, the coefficient for liquidity measure is positive and significant for both 
investment measures for the politically-affiliated business and matching independent 
group, and positive and significant for fully independent group for th second investment 
measure. This result is consistent with Meyer and Kuh's (1957) findings that liquidity is a 
powerful determinant of investment. Thus, the hypothesis of this study that liquidity is 
not an important determinant for investment for the politically-affiliated group is not 
supported, since the coefficient of the liquidity variable for all three groups in the sample 
enters is positive and significant, for the whole sample period and, also, for most47 of the 
first and second sub-periods. The inference is that liquidity is still a very important 
determinant of investment for all groups in the sample regardless of their group-
affiliation. 
The results of the growth measure regression are generally negative and 
significant for all groups in the sample for the whole sample period and the first sub-
period. This again does not support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has 
different investment behavior than the independent groups. Additionally, this result is 
also inconsistent with previous findings of a positive relation between growth and 
investment [Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, ( 1991)]. The coefficient for growth 
47 When the first investment measure is used, the coefficient for liquidity is negative and significant for 
the politically-affiliated group in the first sub-period; and negative and significant for the politically-
affiliatcd group and fully independent group for the second sub-period. 
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measure is negative and significant for both investment measures for the politically-
affiliated group but not for the independent groups. 
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Table 5 
Investment Behavior Regression Results for the Whole Sample Period (1985 - 1994) 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for investment behavior measure for firms in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully 
independent group, for the period 1985-1994 based on ten-year average of INVl , and INV2. The regression model is defined by the two investment behavior measures used. 
Risk is defined by coefficient of variation of annual percentage change in net operating income. GRW is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Adjustments 
are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are 
denoted by ** and* respectively. 
Ind. Var Politically-affiliated Matching Independent Fully Independent 
INV! INV2 INVl INV2 INVl INV2 
Intercept -0.467 (-1.549) -0.396 (-6.218)** 0.388 (l.129) -0.303 (-2 .924)** 0.318 (2 .551)** -0.372 (-4.734)** 
GRW -0.886 (-3.9 12)** -0.797 (-7.673)** -0 .352 (-1.500) -0.545 (-9 .179)** -0.456 (-2.571 )** -0 .021 (-0.420) 
RISK -0.898 (-4. 182 )** 0.030 (l.803) -0.293 (-2 .097)* -0 .039 (-2.077)* 0.326 (5.705)** -0 .178 (-7.122)** 
LIQ 0.225 (3.526)** 0.114 (10.859)** 0.151 (3.427)** 0.098 ( 11.241 )** -0.496 (-2.632)** 0.107 (11 .557)** 
DJ 0.764 (3 .902)** 0.063 (2.879)** -0.989 (-3.544)** 0.143 (4 .512)** 0.155 (5 .327)** 0.011 (0.487) 
D2 0.056 (0.842) 0.179 (5.358)* -0.939 (-3 .662)** 0.245 (6.174 )** 0.134 (0 .279) 0.223 (8.257)** 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.25 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.52 
F-Statistic 38.84 ** 30.25** 27.55** 45.52** 26.33** 60.31 ** 
Sample size 35 35 35 35 35 35 
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Table 5 (continue) 
Investment Behavior Regression Results for the First Sub Period (1985 - 1989) 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for investment behavior measure for firms in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully 
independent group, for the period 1985-1989 based on five-year average of INVl, and INV2. The regression model is defined by the two investment behavior measures used. 
Risk is defined by coefficient of variation of annual percentage change in net operating income. GRW is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Adjustments 
are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are 
denoted by ** and* respectively. 
Ind. Var Poli ti call y-affil iated Matching Independent Fully Independent 
INVl JNV2 INVl JNV2 JNVl INY2 
Intercept 0.217 (3.900)** 0.369 (2.588)** 0.148 (0.132) 0.125 (0.838) 0.698 (l.802) -0.297 (-2 .287)* 
GRW -0.535 (-2 .009)* -0.391 (-2.278)* -2 .031 (-1.857) -0.292 (-2 .839)** 0.136 (0.407) -0.144 (-1.590) 
RISK 0.386 (3 .517)** -0.068 (-1.475) -0.392 (-1.164) -0.066 (-1.762) 0.855 (3 .517)** -0.144 (-3.069)** 
LIQ -0.225 (-3.651)** 0.025 (l.598) 0.359 (2.870)** 0.040 (2.623)** -0.024 (-3 .827)** 0.099 (7.209)** 
01 -0 .273 (-2.475)* 0.069 (-1.475) -1.185 (-1.912) 0.154 (3.447)** 0.404 (3.717)** 0.082 (2.676)** 
02 -0 .192 (-1.934) 0.079 (l.072) -1.236 (-1.915) 0.232 (4.007)** 0.350 (2 .802)** 0.251 (6 .117)** 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.17 0.35 
F-Statistic 8.61 ** 8.19** 9.32 ** 10.67** 5. 78** 14.54** 
Sample size 35 35 35 35 35 35 
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Table 5 (continue) 
Investment Behavior Regression Results for the Second Sub Period (1990 - 1994) 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for investment behavior measure for finns in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully 
independent group, for the period 1990-1994 based on five-year average of INV!, and INV2. The regression model is defined by the two investment behavior measures used. 
Risk is defined by coefficient of variation of armual percentage change in net operating income. GRW is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Adjustments 
are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the I and 5 percent levels are 
denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Ind. Var Politically-affiliated Matching Independent Fully Independent 
INV! INV2 INVl INV2 INVl INV2 
Intercept -1.244 (-0.655) -0.244 (-1.763) -2 .745 (-1. 161) -0.312 (-2.023)* -3.993(-1.305) -0.194 (-1.678) 
GRW -1.421 (-3.303)** -0.429 (-2.775)** -0.661 (-0.720) -0.493 (-6.513)** -1.219 (-0.794) -0.105 (-1.107) 
RISK -0.251 (-3.146)** -0.046 (-1.795) -0.829 (-2.396 )* -0.118 (-5 .218)** -1.245 (-1.562) -0.186 (-4.357)** 
LIQ -0 .103 (2.640)** 0.083 ( 4.351 )** 1.011 (2.766) ** 0.102 (8.688)** 0.724 (2.258)* 0.091 (7.172)** 
DI 0.229 (2.866)** -0.007 (-0.213) -1.392 (2.658)* 0.112 (2.664 )** -0.119 (-0.1 53) -0.004 (-0.111) 
D2 0.155(1.860) 0.089 (1.213) -0.285 (-2 .128)* 0.271 (4.594)** 3.204 (1.613) 0.194 (4.318)** 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.27 0.23 0.49 0.21 0.36 
F-Statistic 18.01 ** 10.49** 8.26** 26.61 ** 8.48** 16.96** 
Sample size 35 35 35 35 35 35 
All Samples Cross-Sectional Regression Analyses 
Table 6 presents the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis for the 
entire sample48 for the whole sample period and the two sub-periods. The models include 
a new dummy variable G, where G is equal to 1 for politically-affiliated group and 0 
otherwise. 
The profitability performance models indicate that only some of the explanatory 
variables for the market-adjusted return model appear with the expected signs and they 
are all significant. The coefficient for the size variable is negative and significant for the 
whole period and second sub-period; the coefficient for the risk variable is negative and 
significant for the entire sample periods, while the coefficient for the liquidity variable is 
positive and significant for the whole period and second sub-period. The dummy variable 
for industrial classification does not provide any meaningful results, except for in the 
second sub-period when the firms in industrial group 1 seem to obtain less market-
adjusted returns, (i.e., about 12 percent less) than the firms in other industrial groups. 
After controlling for the independent variables including the effect of industry 
classification, the coefficient for the dummy variable G indicates that during the whole 
sample period, firms in the politically-affiliated group managed to obtain significantly 
higher market-adjusted returns (about 2 percent higher) than firms in the independent 
group. This result is repeated in the second sub-period. Not only did the firms in the 
48The entire sample consists of 35 politically-affiliated firms, 35 matching independent firms and 35 
fully independent firms. Since firms in the l\¥ 0 independent groups may be overlapped, the entire 
sample consists of only 70 fim1s . In this section, the discussion is based on the entire sample which 
consists of politically-affiliated firms and fully independent fimlS, even though two sets of results are 
obtained, where the second sample consists politically-affiliated firms and matching independent firms. 
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politically-affiliated group obtain significantly higher returns, they obtained about 26 
percent higher than firms in the independent group. Thus, this result not only shows that 
the politically-affiliated group obtained superior profitability performance compared to 
independent group, it also provides support to the first hypothesis of the study. 
Even though the coefficient for the dummy variable G for the ROA and ROE 
models is not significant for the whole sample period and the two sub-periods, the 
explanatory variables for the ROA model during the whole period are all significant. The 
coefficient for the risk and liquidity variables even appear with their expected signs. 
However, consistent with the result on Table 3A for the politically-affiliated group, the 
coefficient for the size variable is again positive throughout the entire sample periods, 
and also significant for the first sub-period, which provides further support to the 
inference that asset-utilization is more efficient in larger firms than in smaller firms. 
In summary, the first hypothesis of superior profitability performance for the 
politically-affiliated group can only be supported in the market-adjusted return model but 
not in the ROA and ROE models. This indicates that there is some significant difference 
in the economic definition of profit between politically-affiliated group and independent 
group. Apparently, the investors' expectation of politically-affiliated business group 
seems to be higher than their expectation of independent group, despite the fact that 
there is no difference in accounting definition of profits between the two groups. 
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Table 6 
Profitability Perfotmance Whole Sample Regression Results 
'111is table presents cross-sectional regression results for profitability perfotmance measure for the whole sample for the whole sample period, 1985-1994, the first sub-period, 
1985-1989, and the second sub-period, 1990-1994, based on average values of ROA, ROE and R*. The regression model is defined by the three perfotmance measures used. 
Risk is defmed by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values of 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the I and 5 percent levels are denoted by** and •respectively. 
Ind. Var Whole Period (1985-1994) First Sub-period (1985-1989) Second Sub-period ( 1990-1994) 
ROA ROE R* ROA ROE R* ROA ROE R* 
Intercept -0.174 -0 .3 11 0.503 -0.222 -0.363 -0 .635 -0.182 -0 .911 2.597 
(-5.103)** (-2 .608) ** (2.661)** (-5.196)* (-2 .355)** (-4.249)** (-3.23)** (-3.807)** (6 .047)** 
SIZE 0.010 0.001 -0.091 0.027 0.027 -0.004 0.010 0.106 -0 .173 
00 
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(2.469)** (0.002) (-3.761)** (4.493)** ( 1.213) (-0.167) (1.583) (3.890)** (-3.467)** 
RJSK 0.045 0.065 -0.165 -0.037 -0.141 -0.039 -0.055 -0.129 -0.623 
(10.875)** (4.4 19)** (-7.050)** (-4.148)** (-4.350)** (-4.429)** (-6.047)** (-3.429)** (-8.008)** 
LIQ 0.023 0.059 0.065 0.009 0.040 0.032 0.013 -0.018 0.024 
(5 .705)** (4 .219)** (2.921)** (l.503) (l.702) ( 1.408) (2.300) (-0.736) (0.527)* 
Dl -0.026 -0.038 -0.005 -0.009 0.045 -0.017 -0.018 -0.028 -0.121 
(-5.414)** (-2 .279)* (-0.188) (-1.151) (1.631) (-0.672) (-2.259)* (-0.787) (-1.945)* 
D2 -0 .017 -0.007 0.055 -0.012 0.003 -0.011 0.022 0.015 -0 .116 
(-2.726)** (-0.324) (l.522) (-1.226) (0.761) (-0.312) (2.012)* (0.303) (-1.290) 
G 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.004 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 0.005 0.265 
(0.587) (0.152) (2.715)** (0.633) (-0.449) (-0.295) (-0.744) (0.157) (4 .292)** 
Adj. RL 0.55 0.41 0.34 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.49 
F-stat. 83.87** 57.76** 40.34** 22.34** 17.69** 15.20** 20.14** 15.73** 17.743** 
Sampk size 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
The financing behavior whole sample regression results in Table 7 indicate that 
only the growth and size variables appear with their expected positive signs. This result 
suggests that size is an important determinant of the financing decision. It also supports 
previous empirical evidence that shows the larger the size of the firm, the easier it is to 
get access to the capital market. However, while the size coefficient is significant 
throughout the whole sample period and the two sub-periods for the two financing 
measure regressions, the growth coefficient is only significant for the second financing 
measure regression in the whole period and first sub-period, and for the first financing 
measure regression in the second sub-period. Since the second financing measure also 
represents the interest-bearing portion of liabilities, it lends support to the pecking order 
theory that rapid growth implies higher debt capacity and an ability to pay interest. The 
growth measure is only positive and significant for the first financing regression model in 
second sub-period. Ironically, this result is not consistent with Table 4 for which a 
separate regression analysis was conducted for each group in the sample. None of the 
groups exhibits a similar behavior for the growth measure (i.e., positive and significant) 
under the second financing decision measure. 
The coefficient for the risk variable is negative and significant (except for the first 
sub-period) throughout the whole sample period and the two sub-periods. Thus the high 
sales volatility may imply a higher probability of financial distress occurring. This result is 
consistent with Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) and Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) 
who found a negative relation between risk and leverage. However, the liquidity variable 
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coefficient appears positive and significant throughout the entire sample periods, 
inconsistent with the pecking order theory. 
Regression results for the industry dummy group 3 indicate that firms in the 
plantation and mining industries consistently prefer to use less interest-bearing loans than 
firms in other industries. Due to the nature of these industries, (i.e., long-term 
investments in plantation and mining) it is perhaps more likely that firms in these 
industries prefer to issue long-term debt rather than relying on a more expensive 
financing method. 
Results for the group dummy variable under the financing behavior models 
provide a more interesting interpretation. The coefficient for the dummy variable G is 
positive and significant for the first financing measure, i.e., FINI, for the entire sample 
periods. The first financing measure represents the percentage of long-term liabilities to 
the total oflong-term liabilities plus market value of equity. This indicates that after 
controlling for the explanatory variables, the politically-affiliated group has a significantly 
higher FINI measure (about 1 percent higher for the whole sample period) than the 
independent groups49. In contrast, when the second financing measure is used, the 
coefficient becomes negative and significant throughout the entire sample periods. The 
second financing measure represents the percentage of interest-bearing loans to the total 
of interest-bearing loans plus the market value of equity. This result thus suggests that 
the independent group prefers to use more interest bearing loans than politically-affiliated 
group. 
49 This result is consistent with Kester ( 1986). Based on a previous finding by Myer and Majluf ( 1984 ). 
he suggested that infonnation effects favor relatively higher financing for the group-affiliated finns in 
Japan. 
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Nevertheless, the analysis once again does not provide any empirical support to 
Yoshihara' s ( 1988) claim that the politically-affiliated group gets easy access to "soft-
loans" provide by government-owned banks and commercial banks. What is evident from 
the analysis is, firms in the politically-affiliated group prefer to use more long-term 
liabilities than firms in the independent groups. The inference is that the politically-
affiliated group is involved in long-term government projects, thus it is only appropriate 
that long-term projects be financed with long-term liabilities. 
To summarize the financing results, the results for the first financing measure 
model support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has higher financing 
levels than independent group, while the second financing measure model does not 
provide support to this hypothesis. It may be true that the politically-affiliated group has 
higher financing level, but the higher financing level employed by the group is not due to 
its easy access to loans, as claimed by Yoshihara (1988), but rather because of its 
involvement in government projects, which generates the need for higher long-term 
financing. 
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Table 7 
Financing Behavior Whole Sample Regression Results 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for financing behavior measure for the whole sample for the whole sample period, 1985-1994, the first 
sub-period, 1985-1989, and the second sub-period, 1990-1994, based on average values of FINI and FIN2. The regression model is defined by the two 
financing measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. GRW is defined by annual compound growth rate in 
total assets. Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Ind. Var Whole Period (1985-1994) First Sub-period (1985-1989) Second Sub-period (I990-I994) 
FINI FIN2 FINI FIN2 FINI FIN2 
Intercept -0.062 (-2. 721 )** -0.003 (-0.027) -0.043 (-0. 941) -0.441 (-2.126)* -0.038 (-1 .253) -0 .345 (-1.960)* 
GRW 0.019 ( 1.278) 0.202 (3.909)** 0.027 ( 1.671) 0.151 (2.484 )* 0.032 (2.438)* 0.040 (0.815) 
SIZE 0.747 (5.892)** 0.431 (7.264)** 0.802 (3.089)** 0.064 (2.140)* 0.811 (4.791)** 0.055 (2.716)** 
RlSK -0.013 (-2.880)** -0.053 (-3.682)** -0.027 (-0.227) -0 .199 (-4.570)** -0.022 (-3.257)** -0.069 (-2. 776 )** 
LIQ 0.015 (5.8 18)** 0.081(5.833)* O.Ql5 (2.936)** 0.171(5.383)** 0.008 (2.224)* 0.031 ( 1.698) 
DI -0.006 (-1.194) 0.055 (3.285)** -0.031 (-2 .993)** -0.017 (-0.481) 0.004 (0.518) 0.036 (1.369) 
D2 0.034 (4 .884)** -0.152 (-6.708)** 0.003 (0 .206) -0.240 (-5 .102)** 0.039 (4.237)** -0. 152 (-4 .284)** 
G 0.014 (3.006)** -0 .048 (-3 .221)* 0.019 (3 .201)** -0.098 (-3.126)** 0.122 (3.221)** -0.085 (-3 .323)** 
Adj. R' 0.86 0.63 0.87 0.59 0.90 0.56 
F-stat. 454.61 •• 111.86** 184.86** 35.03** 321.61 ** 40.11 ** 
Sample size 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Table 8 provides the results of the investment behavior whole sample regression 
for the whole period and two sub-periods. The negative and significant coefficient of the 
growth measure the first investment model is consistent with the results in Table 5, 
where growth is consistently negative for each of the groups in the sample. This also 
indicates that the hypothesis of positive relation between growth and investment cannot 
be supported. On the contrary, the second investment model supports the positive 
relationship in previous finding, where growth is positive and significant throughout the 
entire sample periods. 
The liquidity variable coefficient is negative and significant for the first 
investment model, but positive and significant for the second investment model 
throughout the entire sample (except in the second sub-period for the first investment 
model). The second investment model which represents the stock measure of investment 
is not only consistent with Table 5, but it provides further support to Meyer and Kuh' s 
(1957) finding that liquidity is a powerful determinant of investment. Nevertheless, the 
negative relationship between liquidity and the first investment measure indicates that the 
higher the liquidity, the lower the flow measure of investment. 
However, the risk variable coefficient is negative and significant for both 
investment models throughout the entire sample periods. The reason could be that banks 
may be reluctant to finance investments of firms with higher risk. This is consistent with 
the result in Table 6. Table 6 shows that the risk variable coefficient has a negative and 
significant sign for both financing models for the entire sample periods, which indicates 
that financing is lower when risk is high. 
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Results for the dummy variable G demonstrate that politically-affiliated group has 
a significantly higher flow measure of investment during the two sub-periods than does 
the independent group, but a significantly lower stock measure of investments than 
independent group throughout the entire sample periods. The investment results partly 
support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has a higher investment level 
than the independent group. 
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Table 8 
Investment Behavior Whole Sample Regression Results 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for investment behavior for the whole sample for the whole sample period, 1985-1994, the first sub-period, 
1985-1989. and the second sub-period, 1990-1994, based on average values ofINVl , INV2. The regression model is defined by the two investment measures 
used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net operating income. GR W is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. 
Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 
and 5 percent levels are denoted by** and* respectively. 
Ind. 
Var Whole Period (1985-1994) First Sub-period (1985-1989) Second Sub-period (1990-1994) 
INVl INV2 INVl INV2 INV! INV2 
intercept 0.071 (l.407) -0.337 (-5.40 1)** 0.928 (3.815)** 0.109 (0.874) 0.431 (3 .226)** -0.124 (-1.324) 
GRW -0. 187 (-4.979)** 0.444 (9.058)** -0.159 (-1.026) 0.034 (0.709) -0.526 (-8.609 )** 0.205 (4.803)** 
LIQ -0.248 (3.451)** 0.1 09 (13 .25)** -0.124 (-4.492)** 0.053 (3.738)** -0.469 (-0.298) 0.086 (7.872)** 
RISK -0.414 (-3 .03)** -0.059 (-3 .348)** -0.154 (-4.409)** -0.089 (-2.681)** -0.126 (-3.486)** -0.126 (-5 .03 l)** 
DJ 0.266 (2.094)* 0.038 (2.279)* 0.122(2.021)* 0.074 (2.384)* 0.659 (1.874) 0.00 1 (0.004) 
02 -0.122 (-0.746) 0. 157 (7.350)** -0.105 (-1.378) 0.155 (3.977)** -0.682 (-2.338)* 0.12 1(3 .751)** 
G 0.181 (l.829) -0.102 (-7.887)** 0.161 (3.445)** -0.041 (-2.695)** 0.116 (3. 377)** -0.166 (-8.350)** 
Adj. R2 0.37 0.42 0.36 0.38 0.48 0.36 
F-Stat. 27.28** 45.54** 38.73** 42.72** 39.39** 25.45** 
Sample size 70 70 70 70 70 70 
All Samples Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
Tables 9, 10 and 11 present the pooled cross-sectional regression analysis results 
for the whole samples. Ironically, unlike earlier findings, results for profitability 
performance measures in Table 9 show that all the coefficients for the variables appear 
with the expected signs though few are significant. The coefficient for group dummy 
variable is positive and significant for all the profitability measures. Thus, it confirms 
earlier findings that politically-affilated group achieved higher performance compared to 
independent group. The financing behavior measure pooled regression results are 
consistent with Table 8. The coefficients for the variables of both financing measures 
appear with the expected signs but only size coefficient is not significant. The group 
dummy variable is consistent with results in Table 7, since it is positive for first financing 
measure and negative for second financing measure. Results for the investment measures 
provides support to the hypothesis of positive relation between growth and investment, 
even though previous analysis in the study consistently found a negative relation between 
the two measures. The coefficient for liquidity measure is consistent with the results in 
Table 7. The coefficient is negative and significant for the first investment model but 
positive and significant for the second investment model. Similarly, the coefficient of risk 
is positive for the first measure but negative for the second measure, even though 
previous results in the study found risk to be consistently negative for both investment 
measures. The group dummy variable is also consistent with Table 8, where the 
coefficient is positive for the first investment measure and negative for the second 
investment measure. 
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TABLE 9 
Profitability Performance Pooled Regression Results 
This table presents cross-sectional pooled regression results for profitability performance measures for 
the whole sample based on two sub-period averages of ROA, ROE and R* (i.e., 1984-1989 and 1990-
1994). The regression model is defined by the three performance measures used. Risk is defined by the 
coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for 
heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the l and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Ind. Var ROA ROE 
R* 
Intercept -0.175 (-2 .145)** -0.311 (-2 .608)* 0.503 (2.661)** 
SIZE -0.037 (-2.469)** -0.001 (-0.513) -0.091 (-3 .761)** 
RISK 0.01 l (10.875)** 0.415 (0.621) 0.165 (7.058)** 
LIQ 0.002 (5.705)** 0.225 (0.324) 0.065 (2.921)** 
Dl -0.026 (-5.414)** 0.005 (0.108) -0.014 (-0.108) 
D2 -0.0178 (-2.726)** 0.145 (1.279) -0.108 (-0.052) 
G 0.025 (5 .587)** 0.002 (3 .152)** 0.024 (2.571)** 
Adj . R2 0.78 0.70 0.64 
F-stat. 68.34 ** 62.19** 54.63** 
Sample size 140 140 140 
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TABLE IO 
Financing Behavior Pooled Regression Results 
This table presents cross-sectional pooled regression results for financing behavior measures for the 
whole sample based on two sub-period averages ofFINland FIN2 (i.e., 1984-1989 and 1990-1994). The 
regression model is defined by the two financing measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of 
variation of annual changes in net sales. GRW is defined by by annual compound growth rate in total 
assets. Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values 
oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** 
and* respectively. 
Ind. Var FINI FIN2 
Intercept 0.126 (l.483) -0.224 (-0.647) 
GRW 0.877 (18.37)** 0.228 (5.108)** 
SIZE 0.042 (1.030) 0.098 (2.881)** 
RISK -0.056 (-3 .121)** -0.098 (-2.868)** 
LIQ 0.026 (4.525)** 0.260 (12.540)** 
DI 0.036 (-3 .655)** -0.034 (-2.641)** 
D2 0.007 (0.667) -0.123 (-3 .663)** 
G 0.012 (2.644)** -0.048 (3 .206)** 
Adj . R2 0.97 0.95 
F-stat. 423 .15** 334.52** 
Sample size 140 140 
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TABLE 11 
Investment Behavior Pooled Regression Results 
This table presents cross-sectional pooled regression results for investment behavior measures for the 
whole sample based on two sub-period averages of INVland INV2 (i.e., 1984-1989 and 1990-1994). 
The regression model is defined by the two investment measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient 
of variation of annual changes in net operating income. GR W is defined by annual compound growth 
rate in total assets. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. GRW is 
defined by by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Adjustments are made to correct for 
heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the l and 5 percent levels are denoted by •• and * respectively. 
Ind. Var INV! INV2 
Intercept 3.229 (2.478)** 0.199 (1.465) 
GRW 0.430 (2.150)** 0.362(-3 .233)** 
RISK 1.833 (4.236)** -0.174 (-2.754)** 
LIQ -0.821 (-3 .218)** 0.034(2.903)** 
Dl -0.097 (-0.307) 0.035 (2 .971)** 
02 -0.921 (-0.611) 0.019 (1.147) 
G 0.182 (1.049) -0.102 (-3 .778)** 
Adj . R2 0.57 0.52 
F-stat. 72.85** 65.54** 
Sample size 140 140 
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Summary 
The summary statistics show that there are some significant differences in the 
coefficients of the dependent and independent variables between the politically-affiliated 
business group and the independent group. The regression analysis results for the 
profitability performance and investment measures do not support the hypothesis of 
different profitability performance and investment behavior between the politically-
affiliated group and the independent group. The regression results for the market-
adjusted return model appear to be similar for both the politically-affiliated group and the 
fully independent group, while the regression results for both the investment measures 
also appear similar for the politically-affiliated group and the independent group. 
The all-samples regression results provide interesting evidence. First, the first 
hypothesis, that of superior profitability performance for the politically-affiliated group, 
is only supported under the market-adjusted return model and not under the ROA or 
ROE model. ROA and ROE are not significantly different between the politically-
affiliated group and the independent group. Second, results from the first financing 
measure model support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has higher 
financing level than does the independent group, but the second financing measure does 
not provide support to this hypothesis. Third, the investment model results partly 
support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has higher investment measure 
level than the independent group. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
Conclusions 
This dissertation has examined and compared the profitability performance, 
investment and financing decisions of the politically-affiliated business group of Malaysia 
to the independent business groups of Malaysia. 
Chapter 2 described the development of the New Economic Policy and the 
political involvement in business in Malaysia. Attempts have also been made to compare 
the political-affiliated group to the keiretsu of Japan. This study has identified several 
characteristics possessed by the Japanese keiretsu and the Malaysian politically-affiliated 
group, and has also identified some characteristics which differentiate the two groups. 
Chapter 3 developed the hypotheses of the preferential treatment hypothesis. 
Additionally, it reviewed previous literature and findings for each of the variables used in 
the study. Chapter 4 described the selection of the politically-affiliated group, the two 
independent groups, the period of the study, and the variable measures. Chapter 5 
presented the summary statistics, and analyzed the results of the ordinary least squares 
regression models of the study. 
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The sub-period analysis in chapter 5 largely supports the hypothesis of superior 
profitability performance of the politically-affiliated group. However, while the results of 
ordinary least squares financing decisions model supported the third hypothesis of 
different financing behavior between the politically-affiliated group and independent 
group in Malaysia, the regression results of the investment decisions model did not 
support the second hypothesis of different investment behavior. 
The following major findings of this dissertation deserve emphasis: 
• Based on ROE and R * as profitability performance measures, the performance of 
politically-affiliated business group is lower compared to independent group during 
the first sub-period. This result is consistent with Nak:atani (1984) and Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1995) which found group affiliated firms in Japan obtained lower profitability 
than independent firms. This result also indicates that the preferential treatment 
enforced during the NEP era did not produce quality Bumiputera entrepreneur 
group. 
• The second sub-period of the profitability performance50 analysis provides a different 
scenario altogether. The politically-affiliated group made a remarkable recovery from 
the first sub-period and achieved a significantly superior profitability performance 
compared to the independent groups. The conjecture is that government privatization 
plans during the second sub-period had a positive impact on the group profitability 
so The profitability performance measure mentioned here is the market-adjusted return, R*. When return 
on asset, ROA, and return on equity, ROE, are used as the profitability perforn1ance, the results turned 
out to be not significantly differently. Thus the inference is tl1at, the economic definition of profit 
provides a more powerful evidence for the study compared to the accounting definition of profit. 
Apparently, the investors ' expectation of economic perforn1ance of the politically-affiliated business is 
higher than their expectation of independent group. 
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performance. The preferential treatment hypothesis during the second sub-period can 
be supported. 
• Politically-affiliated group favors higher financing compared to independent group. 
This result is consistent with Kester ( 1986) who found that because of information 
effect, group affiliated firms in Japan favors higher financing than independent firms. 
• Even though the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated business group has higher 
financing level than independent group is supported empirically, the inference is that 
the higher financing level is not due to easy access to loans, (since the second 
financing measure failed to provide any evidence), but rather due to the length of 
time of the long-term government projects in which the politically-affiliated business 
group is involved in being the reason for the higher level of long-term financing. 
• Contrary to previous assertion by Yoshihara (1988), politically-affiliated business 
group does not favor interest-bearing loans (short term loans included) any more 
than the independent group. The summary statistics also indicate that the politically-
affiliated group does not enjoy higher liquidity than independent group. This finding 
is not consistent with Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) who found that group-
affiliated firms in Japan are less liquidity constrained than independent firms. 
• This study provides empirical support to the conjecture that firms in the politically-
affiliated group help out one another in times of financial distress. In the financing 
decision measure model, the relationship between risk and leverage is positive and 
significant for the politically-affiliated group, but the reverse is true for the 
independent groups. Thus, banks may be reluctant to extend loans to independent 
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firms with high operating risk, but this is not so for the politically-affiliated group. 
Alternatively, it could mean that when firms in the politically-affiliated group are 
experiencing financial distress, commercial banks are under strong political pressure 
to offer financial assistance. 
• Generally, the main thrust of the study is that it supports the preferential treatment 
hypothesis of superior profitability performance for the politically-affiliated group 
only in the second sub-period. Since the second sub-period marks the end of the New 
Economic Policy, the inference is that the benefit of the Policy is fully exploited after 
after the policy ends. 
Limitations 
A generalization of the results may be limited due to the nature of the politically-
affiliated group sample, which consists of only 35 firms. Some listed companies which 
are closely affiliated to the ruling party and owned by nominee companies are excluded 
from the samples to avoid further complications. The size of the samples could have been 
larger if more information was available on the identities of beneficiaries for the nominee 
companies. Moreover, since this study requires complete financial data for a full ten-year 
period, due to a lack of data, the sample size was further reduced. 
The existing models are constructed based on the principle of parsimony subject 
to the financial and data constraints. Possibly, some important variables may have been 
omitted which could provide some explanation of the small adjusted R 2 throughout the 
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results. Perhaps a stronger test than White (1980) to adjust for heteroskedasticity may 
produce more significant results throughout. 
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APPENDICES 
104 
Profitability Performance 
1. ROA 
2. ROE 
3. R* 
Investment Measures 
1. INVI 
2. INV2 · 
Financing Measures 
1. FINI 
2. FIN2 
APPENDIX I 
Definition of Variables 
Return on asset 
Return on equity 
Market adjusted rate of return = (Average annual stock 
return - average annual market return) 
changes in net fixed investments I total fixed investments 
net fixed asset/ book value of total assets 
(total liabilities - current liabilities)/ (total liabilities -
current liabilities+ book value of equity) 
(interest-bearing loans)/ (interest-bearing loans +market 
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Growth 
1. GRW 
2. Q 
Size 
Risk 
1. CVl 
2. CV2 
3. Beta 
Liquidity (LIQ) 
Industry Classification 
1. Dl 
2. D2 
Grou Classification G 
APPENDIX I (continue) 
annualized compound growth rate in total assets 
(total liabilities + market value of equity)/( total liabilities 
+book value of equity) 
log (market equity) 
The coefficient of variation of annual changes m net 
operating income 
The coefficient of variation of annual changes m net 
sales 
beta coefficient 
income after tax + accounting depreciation - dividend 
payments 
D 1 = 1 if industry grouping is 1 and zero otherwise 
D2 = 1 if industry grouping is 3 and zero otherwise 
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APPENDIX II 
SAMPLE OF PRIVATIZATION PROJECTS BETWEEN 1983 THROUGH 1991 
1' 
· l'nvatize:!l"K·tOJects ~; . · ir~ N~X.~@:!IU!!lllll~J}~tiW.'fi¥Y:atoottfo~~ 
Sistem Television (M) 1983 Build Operate Fleet Group 
Sports Toto 1985 Sale of Equity Berjaya Group 
Malaysian International Shipping Corp. 1986 Sale of Equity Trust Agencies 
N-S Highway 1988 Build-Operate-Transfer UEM 
0 I -..J 
Edaran Otomobil 1990 Sale of Equity HI COM 
CIMA 1990 Sale of Equity UEM 
Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional 1991 Sale of Equity HI COM 
APPENDIX ill 
List of Politically-affiliated Firms 
1. Faber Group Berhad 
2. Berjaya Sports Toto 
3. Granite Industries Berhad 
4. Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad 
5. Renong Berhad 
6. Benta Plantation 
7. Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging 
8. Kampung Lanjut Tin Berhad 
9. Kramat Tin Berhad 
10. Malaysian Mining Corporation 
11. Petaling Tin Berhad 
12. Tronoh Tin Mines 
13 . Malakoff Berhad 
14. RJReynolds 
15. Uniphoenix Corporation 
16. Aokam Perdana 
17. Berjaya Industrial 
18. Cement Industries Malaysia Berhad 
19. Cold Storage (M) Berhad 
20. Cycle and Carriage (M) Berhad 
21. Land and General 
22. Hume Industries 
23 . Berjaya Group 
24. Kentucky Fried Chicken Holdings 
25. Kinta Kellas Public Limited Companies 
26. New Straits Times Press (M) Berhad 
27. OYL Industries 
28. Technological Resources Industries 
29. Berjaya Leisure 
30. Setron (M) Berhad 
31. Berjaya Textiles 
32. Time Engineering Berhad 
33 . Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad 
34. United Engineers Malaysia 
35. Uniphone Telecommunication Berhad 
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APPENDIX IV 
List of Matching Independent Firms 
1. Bolton Properties 
2. IGB Corporation 
3. Landmarks Berhad 
4. Asia Pacific Berhad 
5. Pelangi Berhad 
6. Kemayan Oil Palm 
7. Lingui Development 
8. Berjuntai Tin Holdings Berhad 
9. Kuchai Development Berhad 
10. Rahman Hydraulic 
11 . Timah Langat 
12. Asiatic Development 
13 . Ajinomoto (M) Berhad 
14. Amalgamated Steel Mills (M) Berhad 
15. Carlsberg Brewery (M) Berhad 
16. Chemical Company ofMalaysia 
1 7. Chocolate Products (M) Berhad 
18. DNP Holdings Berhad 
19. Olympic Industries Berhad 
20. East Asiatic Companies 
21 . Federal Flour Mills (M) Berhad 
22. George Kent (M) Berhad 
23 . Grand United Holdings 
24. Johan Holdings Berhad 
25 . Lien Hoe Group Berhad 
26. Malaya Glass Berhad 
27. Matsushita Electric Company (M) Berhad 
28. Malaysian Mosaic Berhad 
29. Mycom Berhad 
30. Oriental Holdings 
3 1. Pan Malaysian Cement Works 
32. Shell Refining Company (M) Berhad 
33 . Tan Chong Motor Holdings 
34. Leader Universal Holdings 
35 . Worldwide Holdings Berhad 
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APPENDIX V 
List of Fully Independent Firms 
1. Bandaraya Development Berhad 
2. Bolton Properties Berhad 
3. Metroplex Berhad 
4. Paramount Corporation Berhad 
5. Petaling Garden Berhad 
6. Selangor Properties Berhd 
7. Kulirn (M) Berhad 
8. Selangor Coconuts Berhad 
9. TDM Berhad 
10. Anson Perdana Berhad 
11 . Jeram Kuantan (M) Berhad 
12. Kuala Sidim Rubber Co. Limited 
13. Riverview Rubber Estates Berhad 
14. Sungei Bagan Rubber Co. (M) Berhad 
15. Chocolate Products (M) Berhad 
16. General Corporation Berhad 
17. Hexza Corporation Berhad 
18. IJM Corporation Berhad 
19. Innovest Berhad 
20. Jack Chia Enterprises (M) Berhad 
21 . Johan Holdings Berhad 
22. Khong Guan Holdings (M) Berhad 
23. Kumpulan Emas Berhad 
24. Larut Consolidated Ber had 
25 . Lien Hoe Corporation Berhad 
26. Malaysian Mosaics Berhad 
27. MWE Holdings Berhad 
28. Oriental Holdings Berhad 
29. Pegi (M) Berhad 
30. Sanyo Industries (M) Berhad 
31 . Sitt Tatt Berhad 
32. South Malaysia Industries Berhad 
3 3. Inchcape Timuran Berhad 
34. VACBerhad 
35 . United Malayan Flour Mills Berhad. 
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